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Not very long ago, in the pages of this Review, Dr Redlich, whose book
on English Local Government we in England are admiring, did me the
honour of referring to some words that I had written concerning our
English Corporations and our English Trusts.1 I have obtained permis-
sion to say with his assistance a few more words upon the same matter,
in the hope that I may thereby invite attention to a part of our English
legal history which, so far as my knowledge goes, has not attracted all
the notice that it deserves.
Perhaps I need hardly say that we on this side of the sea are pro-
foundly grateful to those foreign explorers who have been at pains to
investigate our insular arrangements. Looking at us from the outside, it
has been possible for them to teach us much about ourselves. Still we
cannot but know that it is not merely for the sake of England that En-
glish law, both ancient and modern, has been examined. Is it not true
that England has played a conspicuous, if a passive, part in that devel-
opment of historical jurisprudence which was one of the most remark-
able scientific achievements of the nineteenth century? Over and over
again it has happened that our island has been able to supply just that
piece of evidence, just that link in the chain of proof, which the Germanist
wanted but could not find at home. Should I go too far if I said that no
Germanistic theory is beyond dispute until it has been tested upon our
English material?2/Frederic Maitland
Now I know of nothing English that is likely to be more instructive
to students of legal history, and in particular to those who are concerned
with Germanic law, than that Rechtsinstitut of ours which Dr Redlich
described in the following well chosen words: “das Rechtsinstitut des
Trust, das ursprünglich für gewisse Bedürfnisse des englischen
Grundeigenthumsrechtes entstanden, nach und nach zu einem allgemeinen
Rechtsinstitute ausgebildet worden ist und auf allen Gebieten des
Rechtslebens praktische Bedeutung und eine ausserordentlich verfeinerte
juristische Aushildung erlangt hat.”2
It is a big affair our Trust. This must be evident to anyone who
knows and who does not know?—that out in America the mightiest
trading corporations that the world has ever seen are known by the name
of “Trusts.” And this is only the Trust’s last exploit. Dr Redlich is right
when he speaks of it as an “allgemeine Rechtsinstitut.” It has all the
generality, all the elasticity of Contract. Anyone who wishes to know
England, even though he has no care for the detail of Private Law, should
know a little of our Trust.
We may imagine an English lawyer who was unfamiliar with the
outlines of foreign law taking up the new Civil Code of Germany. “This”
he would say, “seems a very admirable piece of work, worthy in every
way of the high reputation of German jurists. But surely it is not a
complete statement of German private law. Surely there is a large gap in
it. I have looked for the Trust, but I cannot find it; and to omit the Trust
is, I should have thought, almost as bad as to omit Contract.” And then
he would look at his book-shelves and would see stout volumes entitled
“Law of Trusts,” and he would open his “Reports” and would see trust
everywhere, and he would remember how he was a trustee and how
almost every man that he knew was a trustee.
Is it too bold of me to guess the sort of answer that he would receive
from some German friend who had not studied England? “Well, before
you blame us, you might tell us what sort of thing is this wonderful
Trust of yours. You might at least point out the place where the sup-
posed omission occurs. See, here is our general scheme of Private Law.
Are we to place this precious Rechtsinstitut under the title Sachenrecht
or should it stand under Recht der Schuldverhältnisse, or, to use a term
which may be more familiar, Obligationenrecht”?
To this elementary question I know of no reply which would be
given at once and as a matter of course by every English lawyer. We are
told in one of our old books that in the year 1348 a certain EnglishTrust and Corporation/3
lawyer found himself face to face with the words contra inhibitionem
novi operis, and therefore said, “en ceux parolx il n’y ad pas
d’entendment.” I am not at all sure that some men very learned in our
law would not be inclined to give a similar answer if they were required
to bring our Trust under any one of those rubrics which divide the Ger-
man Code.
“Des englische Recht,” says Dr Redlich, “kennt keine Unterscheidung
von öffentlichem und privatem Recht.” In the sense in which he wrote
that sentence it is, I think, very true. Now-a-days young men who are
beginning to study our law are expected to read books in which there is
talk about this distinction: the distinction between Private Law and Public
Law. Perhaps I might say that we regard those terms as potential ru-
brics. We think, or many of us think, that if all our law were put into a
Code that pair of terms might conveniently appear in very large letters.
But they are not technical terms. If I saw in an English newspaper chat
Mr A. B. had written a book on “Public Law,” my first guess would be
that he had been writing about International Law. If an English newspa-
per called Mr. C. D. a “publicist,” I should think that he wrote articles
in newspapers and magazines about political questions.
In the same sense it might be said that English Law knows no dis-
tinction between Sachenrecht and Obligationenrecht. It is needless to
say that in England as elsewhere there is a great difference between
owning a hundred gold coins and being owed a hundred pounds, and of
course one of the first lessons that any beginner must learn is the appre-
hension of this difference. And then he will read in more or less specula-
tive books—books of “General Jurisprudence”—about iura in rem and
iura in personam, and perhaps will be taught that if English law were
put into a Code, this distinction . would appear very prominently. But
here again we have much rather potential rubrics than technical terms.
The technical concepts wick which the English lawyer will have to op-
erate, the tools of his trade (if I may so speak), are of a different kind.
I have said this because, so it seems to me, the Trust could hardly
have been evolved among a people who had clearly formulated the dis-
tinction between a right in personam and a right in rem, and had made
that distinction one of the main outlines of their legal system. I am aware
that the question how far this distinction was grasped in medieval Ger-
many has been debated by distinguished Germanists, and I would not
even appear to be intervening between Dr Laband and Dr Heusler. Still
I cannot doubt who it is that has said the words that will satisfy the4/Frederic Maitland
student of English legal history. In the thirteenth century Englishmen
find a distinction between the actio in rem and the actio in personam in
those Roman books which they regard as the representatives of enlight-
ened jurisprudence. They try to put their own actions—and they have a
large number of separate actions, each with its own name, each with its
own procedure—under these cosmopolitan rubrics. And what is the re-
sult? Very soon the result is that which Dr Laband has admirably stated:
Die Klage characterisirt sich nach dem, was der Kläger fordert,
wozu ihm der Richter verhelfen soll, nicht nach dem Grunde, aus
welchem er es fordert... Dagegen vermisst man in den Quellen
des Mittelalters eine Characterisirung der Klagen nach dem zu
Grunde liegenden Rechtsverhältniss und insbesondere der
Unterscheidung dinglicher und persönlicher Klagen. Der der
römischen Bezeichnung actio in rem scheinbar entsprechende
Ausdruck clage up gut [in England real action] hat gar keinen
Zusammenhang mit der juristischen Natur des Rechts des Klägers,
sondern er bezieht sich nur darauf, class das bezeichnete Gut vom
Kläger in Anspruch genommen wird.3
To this very day we are incumbered with those terms “real property”
and “personal property” which serve us as approximate equivalents for
Liegenschaft and Fahrnis. The reason is that in the Middle Age, and indeed
until 1854, the claimant of a movable could only obtain a judgment which
gave his adversary a choice between giving up that thing and paying its
value. And so, said we, there is no actio realis for a horse or a book. Such
things are not “realty”; they are not “real property.” Whether this use of
words is creditable to English lawyers who are living in the twentieth cen-
tury is not here the question; but it seems to me exceedingly instructive.
For my own part if a foreign friend asked me to tell him in one word
whether the right of the English Destinatär (the person for whom property
is held in trust) is dinglich or obligatorisch, I should be inclined to say:
“No, I cannot do that. If I said dinglich, that would be untrue. If I said
obligatorisch, I should suggest what is false. In ultimate analysis the right
may be obligatorisch; but for many practical purposes of great importance
it has been treated as though it were dinglich, and indeed people habitually
speak and think of it as a kind of Eigenthum.”
This, then, is the first point to which I would ask attention; and I do so
because, so far as my knowledge goes, this point is hardly to be seen upon
the surface of those books about English law that a foreign student is mostTrust and Corporation/5
likely to read.4
I
Before going further I should like to transcribe some sentences from an
essay in legal history which has interested me deeply: I mean “Die
langobardische Treuhand und ihre Umbildung zur Testaments-
vollstreckung” by Dr Alfred Schultze.5 I think that we may see what is
at the root the same Rechtsinstitut taking two different shapes in differ-
ent ages and different lands, and perhaps a German observer will find
our Trust the easier after a short excursion into Lombardy.
To be brief, the Lombard cannot make a genuine testament. He
therefore transfers the whole or some part of his property to a Treuhänder,
who is to carry out his instructions. Such instructions may leave greater
or less liberty of action to the Treuhänder. He may only have to transfer
the things to some named person or some particular church, or, at the
other extreme, he may have un unlimited choice among the various means
by which the soul of a dead man can be benefited. And now we will
listen to Dr Schultze:
Das Treuhandverhältnis wird regelmässig begründet durch Vertrag
zwischen dem letztwillig Verfügenden und dem von ihm zum
Treuhänder Erkorenen. Dieser Vertrag stellt sich da, wo dem
Trenhänder eine unmittelbare Gewalt über körperliche Sachen
zugewiesen wird, häufig schon durch seine äussere Erscheinung
als dinglicher Vertrag dar. Jene Sachen werden ihm per cartam zu
dem gewollten Zweck übertragen. Dabei ist ausdrücklich von
“tradere res” die Rede.... Einzelne Urkunden des Regesto di Farfa
aus dem II Jahrhundert sprechen von der Investitur, die der
Schenker dem Treuhänder ertheilt hat. Der Schenker tradirt an
den Treuhänder nicht blos das fragliche Grundstück, sondern auch,
wie das nach einer langobardischen Rechtssitte bei Uebertragung
dinglicher Rechte zu geschehen pflegt, seine eigene
Erwerbsurkunde und diejenigen seiner Vorgänger, soweit sie sich
in seinem Besitze befinden. Er wendet, wenn er ein Franke ist, die
fränkischen Investitursymbole, festuca notate, Messer, Scholle,
Zweig und Handschuh, an.6
That is what I should have expected, an English reader would say.
The land is conveyed to the trustee. Of course he has ein dingliches
Recht. He has Eigenthum. In the Middle Age he will be feoffatus, vestitus
et seisitus; feffé, vestu et seisi. And naturally die Erwerbsurkunden,6/Frederic Maitland
“the title deeds,” are handed over to him. But we must return to Dr
Schultze’s exposition:
Der Treuhänder hat, wie soeben nachgewiesen ist, kraft
Rechtsnachfolge ein eigenes dingliches Recht an den ihm
zugewiesenen körperlichen Sachen. Welcher Art ist dieses Recht?
Wir haben zunächst einige Urkunden herauszuheben die keinen
Zweifel daran lessen, dass hier der Treuhänder volles Eigenthum
hat und in der Nutzniessung und Verfügung weder dinglich noch
obligatorisch beschränkt ist. Es sind sämmtlich Fälle, in denen
der Geber die Sachen im Interesse seines Seelenheils nach freier
Bestimmung des Treuhänders verwendet wissen will, sodass der
letztere die Rolle des Dispensators im eigentlichen Sinne hat.7
This, however, was not the common case. Generally what the
Treuhänder has is not
die voile, freie Verfügungsmacht, sondern ein in bestimmten
Schranken gebanntes Veräusserungsrecht. “Er nimmt hier im
Verhältnis zu der oben geschilderten Rechtsstellung des
Dispensators optimo jure eine Minderstellung ein. Aber worin
besteht die Minderung? Es kann an dieser Stelle noch unerörtert
bleiben, ob hier der Treuhänder obligatorisch beschränkt, dem
Geber oder dessen Erben oder sonst jemandem kraft Privatrechts
obligatorisch verpflichtet ist. Es handelt sich hier vielmehr um
die Frage, ob sein Recht ein dinglich gemindertes ist. Diese Frage
ist zu bejahen.”8
Dr Schultze then proceeds to expound the Treuhänder’s right as
“Eigenthum, aber Eigenthum unter auflösender Bedingung,
resolutiv bedingtes Eigenthum.” “Die Bedingung wurde existent
wenn das Vergabungsobject dem gesetzten Zweck entfremdet oder
der Zweck aus irgend einem Grunde unerfullbar wurde. Die Folge
war, dass das Eigenthum auf Seiten des Treuhänders erlosch und
ohne jede Rücktradition dem Geber oder seinen Erben anfiel, die
nun mit der dinglichen Klage (Eigenthumsklage) das Gut wieder
in ihren Besitz bringen konnten.”9
Now that is not true of the English trustee. His right is not “resolutiv
bedingtes Eigenthum.” I cite it, however, because of what follows. And
what follows is highly instructive to those who would study EnglishTrust and Corporation/7
“equity”: indeed some of Dr Schultze’s sentences might have been writ-
ten about the England of the fourteenth or the England of the twentieth
century:
Die in der schwebenden Resolutivbedingung liegende dingliche
Beschränkung des Eigenthums zu treuer Hand konnte gegen
Dritterwerber Wirkung haben.... Diese Wirkung gegen Dritte setzte
Offenkundigkeit (Publizität) jener dinglichen Beschränkung
voraus, ein solches Mass von Offenkundigkeit, dass jeder
Dritterwerber ohne Härte der Beschränkung unterworfen werden
konnte, gleichgültig ob er im einzelnen Falle wirklich davon wusste
oder nicht. Nun mögen auch die Langobarden in Bezug auf
Grundstücke früher eine volksrechtliche Form der Rechts-
veränderung gekannt haben, welche den Act selbst im Augenblick
seiner Vornahme den Volksgenossen in genügendem Masse
kundthat (Vornahme auf dem Grundstück, in mallo). In der hier
interessirenden Zeit war aber bei weitem vorherrschend und wurde
jedenfalls bei den ordentlichen Vergabungen auf den Todesfall,
auch denjenigen zu treuer Hand, ausschliesslich angewendet die
Form der traditio cartae.... Jede Rechtsveränderung die vermittelst
traditio cartae stattgefunden hatte, war damit erschöpfend
beurkundet.... Wer ein Grundstück in derivativer Weise erwerben
wollte, erlangte daher über das Recht seines Auktors dadurch
sichere Auskunft, dass er sich die carta vorweisen liess, die
seinerzeit für den Auktor von dessen Vorgänger ausgestellt worden
war. Es wurde sogar schon frühe üblich diese carte zur dauernden
Sicherung der Legitimation sich mit dem Grundstück zusammen
übereignen zu lassen. Und—das war nur eine selbstverständliche
Folgerung—nicht blos die Erwerbsurkunde des Auktors, sondern
auch die in dessen Hand befindlichen sämmtlichen
Erwerbsurkunden seiner Vorgänger.... Wer also von einem
Treuhänder ein Grundstück erwerben wollte, erkannte sofort bei
Prüfung der bis zu diesem herabreichenden Urkunden die
Treuhänder-Eigenschaft des Gegenparts, die Bedingtheit seines
Eigenthums. Kümmerte er sich aber der Rechtssitte zuwider nicht
um die Erwerbsurkunden, so lag dann darin, dass die Bedingung,
unvorhergesehen, auch gegen ihn ihreWirksamkeit entfaltete, keine
Härte, der ihm etwa daraus erwachsende Schade traf ihn nicht
unverschuldet.10
But what have we here?—an Englishman might say—why, it is our
“doctrine of constructive notice,” the keystone which holds together the8/Frederic Maitland
lofty edifice of trusts that we have raised. These Lombards, he would
add, seem to have gone a little too far, and with a “resolutiv bedingtes
Eigenthum” we have not to do. But of course the Eigenthum of a piece
of land is conveyed per traditionem cartae. And of course every pru-
dent buyer of land will expect to see die Erwerbsurkunden which are in
his Auktor’s hand and to have them handed over to himself when the
sale is completed. “Kümmerte er sich aber der Rechtsitte zuwider nicht
um die Erwerbsurkunden,” then there is no hardship if he is treated as
knowing all that he would have discovered had he behaved as reason-
able men behave. He has “constructive notice” of it all. “Der ihm etwa
daraus erwachsende Schade trifft ihn nicht unverschuldet.”
We must make one other excerpt before we leave Lombardy:
<bq>Indessen dies galt nur für Liegenschaften. Dem
Fahrnisverkehr fehlten, ebenso wie in den übrigen germanischen
Rechten, Vorkehrungen, die einem die Uebereignung
beschränkenden Geding Publizität im Verhältnis zu Dritten
verschafft hätten.... Gewiss war der letztwillige Treuhänder auch
in Ansehung der Mobilien durch die Zweckbestimmung rechtlich
gebunden. Gewiss war er dinglich gebunden und haste, wie an
Grundstücken, nur resolutiv bedingtes Eigenthum.... Hatte er die
Mobilien aber bereits an die falsche Adresse befördert, so konnten
die Erben des Donators gegen die dritten Besitzer, selbst wenn sie
beim Erwerb die Sachlage überschaut hatten, nichts ausrichten.
Der Grund, weswegen bei Liegenschaften alle Dritten der Wirkung
des Gedings unterworfen wurden, war hier nicht gegeben... Waren
die dem Treuhünder anvertrauten Mobilien durch Veruntrenung
aus seinem Besitz gelangt und daher mit der dinglichen
Rückforderungsklage “Malo ordine possides” nicht erreichbar, so
trat an die Stelle eine persönliche Schadenersatzklage.11</b1>
That does not go quite far enough, the English critic might say. If it
could be proved that der dritte Besitzer actually knew of the “trust,” it
does not seem to me equitable that he should be able to disregard it.
Also it does not seem to me clear that if the movables can no longer be
pursued, the claim of the Destinatär must of necessity be a mere
persönliche Schadenersatzklage against the Trenhänder. But it is most
remarkable to see our cousins the Lombards in these very ancient days
seizing a distinction that is very familiar to us. The doctrine of “con-
structive notice” is not to be extended from land to movables.12Trust and Corporation/9
II
We may now turn to the England of the fourteenth century, and in the
first place I may be suffered to recall a few general traits of the English
law of that time, which, though they may be well enough known, should
be had in memory.
A deep and wide gulf lies between Liegenschaft and Fahrnis. It is
deeper and wider in England than elsewhere. This is due in part to our
rigorous primogeniture, and in part to the successful efforts of the Church
to claim as her own an exclusive jurisdiction over the movables of a
dead man, whether he has made a last will or whether he has died intes-
tate. One offshoot of the ancient Germanic Trenhandschaft is already a
well established and flourishing institute. The English last will is a will
with executors. If there is no will or no executor, an “administrator”
appointed by the bishop fills the vacant place. This will is no longer a
donatio post obitum of the old kind, but under canonical influence has
assumed a truly testamentary character. The process which makes the
executor into the “personal representative” of the dead man, his repre-
sentative as regards all but his Liegenschaft, is already far advanced. It
is a process which in course of time makes the English executor not
unlike a Roman haeres. In later days when the Trust, strictly so called,
had been developed, these two institutes, which indeed had a common
root, began to influence each other. We began to think of the executor as
being for many purposes very like a trustee. However, the Trust, prop-
erly so called, makes its appearance on the legal stage at a time when the
Englishman can already make a true testament of his movables, and at a
time when the relationship between the executor and the legatees is a
matter with which the secular courts have no concern.
As to dealings with movables inter vivos, we cannot say that there
is any great need for a new Rechtsinstitut. It is true that in the fourteenth
century this part of our law is not highly developed. Still it meets the
main wants of a community that knows little of commerce. We will
notice in passing that the current language is often using a term which,
when used in another context, will indicate the germ of the true Trust:
namely the term that in Latin is ad opus, and in French al oes. Often it
is said that one man holds goods or receives money ad opus alterius.
But the Common Law is gradually acquiring such categories as deposit,
mandate and so forth, which will adequately meet these cases. This part
of our law is young and it can grow.
On the other hand, the land law is highly developed, and at every10/Frederic Maitland
point it is stiffened by a complicated system of actions and writs (bre-
via). A wonderful scheme of “estates”—I know not whether that word
can be translated—has been elaborated: “estates in fee simple, estates
in fee tail, estates for life, estates in remainder, estates in reversion,
etc.”; and each “estate” is protected by its corresponding writ (breve).
The judges, even if they were less conservative than they are, would find
it difficult to introduce a new figure into this crowded scene. In particu-
lar we may notice that a “resolutiv bedingtes Eigenthum,” which Dr
Schultze finds in Lombardy, is very well known and is doing very hard
work. All our Pfandrecht is governed by this concept. More work than
it is doing it could hardly do.
Then in the second half of the fourteenth century we see a new
Court struggling for existence. It is that Court of Chancery whose name
is to be inseverably connected with the Trust. The old idea that when
ordinary justice fails, there is a reserve of extraordinary justice which
the king can exercise is bearing new fruit. In civil (privatrechtliche)
causes men make their way to the king’s Chancellor begging him in
piteous terms to intervene “for the love of God and in the way of char-
ity.” It is not of any defect in the material law that they complain; but
somehow or another they cannot get justice. They are poor and helpless;
their adversaries are rich and powerful. Sheriffs are partial; jurors are
corrupt. But, whatever may be the case with penal justice, it is by no
means clear that in civil suits there can be any room for a formless,
extraordinary jurisdiction. Complaints against interference with the or-
dinary course of law were becoming loud, when something was found
for the Chancellor to do, and something that he could do with general
approval. I think it might be said that if the Court of Chancery saved the
Trust, the Trust saved the Court of Chancery.
And now we come to the origin of the Trust. The Englishman can-
not leave his land by will. In the case of land every germ of testamentary
power has been ruthlessly stamped out in the twelfth century. But the
Englishman would like to leave his land by will. He would like to pro-
vide for the weal of his sinful soul, and he would like to provide for his
daughters and younger sons. That is the root of the matter.13 But further,
it is to be observed that the law is hard upon him at the hour of death,
more especially if he is one of the great. If he leaves an heir of full age,
there is a relevium to be paid to the lord. If he leaves an heir under age,
the lord may take the profits of the land, perhaps for twenty years, and
may sell the marriage of the heir. And then i there is no heir, the landTrust and Corporation/11
falls back (“escheats”) to the lord for good and all.
Once more recourse is had to the Treuhänder. The landowner con-
veys his land to some friends. They are to hold it “to his use (a son
oes).” They will let him enjoy it while he lives, and he can tell them what
they are to do with it after his death.
I say that he conveys his land, not to a friend, but to some friends.
This is a point of some importance. If there were a single owner, a single
feoffatus, he might die, and then the lord would claim the ordinary rights
of a lord; relevium, custodia haeredis, maritagium haeredis, escaeta,
all would follow as a matter of course. But here the Germanic
Gesammthandschafft comes to our help. Enfooff five or perhaps ten
friends zu gesammter Hand (“as joint tenants”). When one of them dies
there is no inheritance; there is merely accrescence. The lord can claim
nothing. If the number of the feoffati is running low, then indeed it will
be prudent to introduce some new ones, and this can be done by some
transferring and retransferring. But, if a little care be taken about this
matter, the lord’s chance of getting anything is very small
Here is a principle that has served us well in the past and is serving
us well in the present. The “Gesammthandprincip” enables us to erect
(if I may so speak) a wall of trustees which will not be always in need of
repair. Some of those “charitable” trusts of which I am to speak hereaf-
ter will start with numerous trustees, and many years may pass away
before any new documents are necessary. Two may die, three may die;
but there is no inheritance; there is merely accrescence; what was owned
by ten men, is now owned by eight or by seven; that is all.14
In a land in which Roman law has long been seriously studied it
would be needless, I should imagine, for me to say that it is not in Ro-
man books that Englishmen of the fourteenth century have discovered
this device; but it may be well to remark that any talk of fides, fiducia,
fideicommissum is singularly absent from the earliest documents in which
our new Rechtsinstitut appears. The same may be said of the English
word “trust.” All is being done under the cover of ad opus. In Old French
this becomes al oes, al ues or the like. In the degraded French of Stratford-
atte-Bow we see many varieties of spelling. It is not unusual for learned
persons to restore the Latin p and to write oeps or eops. Finally in
English mouths (which do not easily pronounce a French u) this word
becomes entangled with the French use. The English for “ad opus meum”
is “to my use.”
It is always interesting, if we can, to detect the point at which a new12/Frederic Maitland
institute or new concept enters the field of law. Hitherto the early history
of our “feoffments to uses” has been but too little explored: I fear that
the credit of thoroughly exploring it is reserved for some French or
German scholar. However, there can be little doubt that the new prac-
tice first makes its appearance in the highest and noblest circles of soci-
ety. I will mention one early example. The “feoffor” in this case is John
of Gaunt, son of a King of England and himself at one time titular King
of Castile. Among the persons who are to profit by the trust is his son
Henry who will be our King Henry IV.
On the 3rd of February, 1399, “old John of Gaunt, time-honoured
Lancaster” makes his testament.15 Thereby he disposes of his movables
and he appoints seventeen executors, among whom are two bishops and
three earls. To this instrument he annexes a “Codicillus” (as he calls it)
which begins thus:
Item, la ou jeo Johan filz du Roy d’Engleterre, Duc de Lancastre,
ay purchacez et fait purchacer a mon eops diverges seigneuries,
manoirs, terres, tenementz, rentz, services, possessions, reversions
et advoesons des benefices de seint esglises, ove leur appurtenances.
. . si ay je fait faite cest cedule annexee a cest mon testament,
contenant ma darrein et entier volente touchant les suisdites
seigneuries, manoirs, terres, tenementz, rentz, services, posses-
sions, reversions, avoesons ove leur appurtenances.
He then says what is to be done with these lands. Thus for example:
Item je vueille que mon trescher Batchelor Monsieur Robert Nevyll,
William Gascoigne, mes treschers esquiers Thomas de Radeclyff
et William Keteryng, et mon trescher clerk Thomas de Longley, qi
de ma ordennance vent enfeffez en [le] manoir de Bernolswyk en
[le] Counte d’Everwyk facent annuelement paler a mes
executours....
To be brief, certain sums of money are to be paid to the executors,
who will apply them for pious purposes, and
adonques soit estat fait du dit manoir a mon trezaime filz aizne
Henry duc de Hereford et a ses heirs de son corps; et par defaute
d’issue du ditz Henry, la remeindre16 a mez droiz heirs.
Then at the end stand these words:Trust and Corporation/13
Item je vueille que toutz autres seigneuries, manoirs, terrez... ove
leurs appurtenances, a mon eops purchasez et remaignantz uncore
es mains des enfeffez par moi a ce ordennez, soient apres ma mort
(si je ne face autre ordenance en ma vie) donnez a l’avantdit Tho-
mas mon filz a avoir a lui et a ses heirs de son corps issantz; et par
defaute d’issue de son corps, la remeindre a l’avantdit Johan son
frere et a sez heirs de son corps issantz; et par defaute d’issue de
dit Johan, la remeindre a la susdite Johanne leur seur et a ses heirs
de son corps issantz, et par defaute d’issue de la cite Johanne, la
remeindre a mez drois heirs qui serront heirs del heritage de
Lancastre: veuillantz toutez voies que toutes icestes mes volentees
ordenances et devys en ceste cedule compris, soient tout accomplez
par ceulx q’en averont l’estat et poveir, et par l’avys ordenance et
conseil de gentz de loy, en la plus sure manere que en se purra
ordenner.
We see what the situation is. The Duke has transferred various lands
to various parties of friends and dependents. When he feels that death is
approaching, he declares what his wishes are, and they fall under two
heads. He desires to increase the funds which his executors are to ex-
pend for the good of his soul, and he desires also to make some provi-
sion for his younger and (so it happens) illegitimate children.
Apparently the new fashion spread with great rapidity. We have not
in print so many collections of wills as we ought to have; but in such as
have been published the mention of land held to the testator’s “use”
begins to appear somewhat suddenly in the last years of the fourteenth
century and thenceforward it is common. We are obliged to suppose
that the practice had existed for some time before it found legal protec-
tion. But that time seems to have been short. Between 1396 and 1403
the Chancellor’s intervention had been demanded.17
It would have been very difficult for the old Courts, “the Courts of
Common Law,” to give any aid. As already said, the system of our land
law had become prematurely osseous. The introduction without Act of
Parliament of a new dingliches Recht, some new modification of
Eigenthum, would have been impossible. In our documents we see no
attempt to meet the new case by an adaptation of the terms that are
employed when there is to be a “resolutiv bedingtes Eigenthum.”18 And
on the other hand we see a remarkable absence of those phrases which
are currently used when an obligatorischer Vertrag is being made. No14/Frederic Maitland
care is taken to exact from the Treuhänder a formal promise that the
trust shall be observed. From the first men seem to feel that a contract
binding the trustees to the author of the trust, binding the feoffati to the
feoffator, is not what is wanted.
Moreover, it was probably felt, though perhaps but dimly felt, that
if once the old Courts began to take notice of these arrangements a great
question of policy would have to be faced. The minds of the magnates
were in all probability much divided. They wanted to make wills. But
they were “lords,” and it was not to their advantage that their “tenants”
should make wills. And then there was one person in England who had
much to gain and little to lose by a total suppression of this novelty.
That person was the King, for he was always “lord” and never “tenant.”
An open debate about this matter would have made it evident that if
landowners, and more especially the magnates, were to make wills, the
King would have a fair claim for compensation. Even medieval En-
glishmen must have seen that if the King could not “live of his own,” he
must live by taxes. The State must have a revenue. Perhaps we may say,
therefore, that the kindest
thing that the old Courts could do for the nascent Trust was to look
the other way. Certain it is that from a very early time some of our great
lawyers were deeply engaged in the new practice. We have seen a cer-
tain William Gascoigne as a Treuhänder for John of Gaunt. He was
already a distinguished lawyer. He was going to be Chief Justice of
England and will be known to all Shakespeare’s readers. Thomas Littleton
(ob. 1481) when he expounds the English land law in a very famous
book will have hardly a word to say about “feoffments to uses”; but
when he makes his own will he will say, “Also I wulle that the feoffees
to myn use [of certain lands] make a sure estate unto Richard Lyttelton
my sonne, and to the heirs of his bodie.”
When we consider where the king’s interest lay, it is somewhat sur-
prising that the important step should be taken by his first minister, the
Chancellor. It seems very possible, however, that the step was taken
without any calculation of loss and gain.19 We may suppose a scandal-
ous case. Certain persons have been guilty of a flagrant act of dishon-
esty, condemned by all decent people. Here is an opportunity for the
intervention of a Court which has been taught that it is not to intervene
where the old Courts of Common Law offer a remedy. And as with
politics, so with jurisprudence.
I doubt whether in the first instance our Chancellor troubled hisTrust and Corporation/15
head about the “juristic nature” of the new Rechtsinstitut or asked him-
self whether the new chapter of English law that he was beginning to
write would fall under the title Sachenrecht or under the title
Obligationenrecht. In some scandalous case he compelled the trustees
to do what honesty required. Men often act first and think afterwards.
For some time we see hesitation at important points. For example,
we hear a doubt whether the trust could be enforced against the heir of
a sole trustee. As already said, efforts were generally made to prevent
this question arising: to prevent the land coming to the hands of one
man. So long as the wall was properly repaired, there would be no in-
heriting. But on the whole our new Rechtsinstitut seems soon to find the
line of least resistance and to move irresistibly forward towards an ap-
pointed goal.
III
We are to speak of the rights of the Destinatär, or in our jargon cestui
que trust.20 Postponing the question against whom those rights will be
valid, we may ask how those rights are treated within the sphere of their
validity. And we soon see that within that sphere they are treated as
Eigenthum or as some of those modalities of Eigenthum in which our
medieval land. law is so rich. The Destinatär has an “estate,” not in the
land, but in “the use.” This may be “an estate in fee simple, an estate for
life, an estate in remainder,” and so forth. We might say that “the use” is
turned into an incorporeal thing, an incorporeal piece of land; and in
this incorporeal thing you may have all those rights, those “estates,”
which you could have in a real, tangible piece of land. And then in
course of time movable goods and mere Forderungen are held in trust,
and we get, as it were, a second edition of our whole Vermögensrecht: a
second and in some respects an amended edition. About all such matters
as inheritance and alienation, the Chancellor’s Equity, so we say, is to
follow the Common Law.
Another point was settled at an early date. The earliest trust is in the
first instance a trust for the author of the trust; he is not only the author
of the trust but he is the Destinatär. But it is as Destinatär and not as
contracting party that he obtains the Chancellor’s assistance. The no-
tion of contract is not that with which the Chancellor works in these
cases: perhaps because the old Courts profess to enforce contracts. It is
the destinatory who has the action, and he may be a person who was
unborn when the trust was created. This is of importance for, curiously16/Frederic Maitland
enough, after some vacillation our Courts of Common Law have adopted
the rule that in the case of a “pactum in favorem tertii” the tertius has no
action.
But a true ownership, a truly dingliches Recht, the destinatory can-
not have. In the common case a full and free and unconditioned owner-
ship has been given to the trustees. Were the Chancellor to attempt to
give the destinatory a truly dingliches Recht, the new Court would not
be supplementing the work of the old Courts, but undoing it.
This brings us to the vital question, “Against whom can the
destinatory’s right be enforced”? We see it enforced against the original
trustees. Then after a little while we see it enforced against the heir of a
trustee who has inherited the land; and, to speak more generally, we see
it enforced against all those who by succession on death fill the place of
a trustee. But what of a person to whom in breach of trust the trustee
conveys the land? Such a person, so far as the old Courts can see, ac-
quires ownership: full and free ownership: nothing less. The question is
whether, although he be owner, he can be compelled to hold the land in
trust for the destinatory. We soon learn that all is to depend upon the
state of his “conscience” at the time when he acquired the ownership. It
is to be a question of “notice.” This we are told already in 1471. “If my
trustee conveys the land to a third person who well knows that the trustee
holds for my use, I shall have a remedy in the Chancery against both of
them: as well against the buyer as against the trustee: for in conscience
he buys my land.”21
That is a basis upon which a lofty structure is reared. The concept
with which the Chancellor commences his operations is that of a guilty
conscience. If any one knowing that the land is held upon trust for me
obtains the ownership of it, he does what is unconscientious and must
be treated as a trustee for me. In conscience the land is “ma terre.”
This being established, no lawyer will be surprised to hear that the
words “if he knew” are after a while followed by the words “or ought to
have known,” or that a certain degree of negligence is coordinated with
fraud. By the side of “actual notice” is placed “constructive notice.”
And now we may refer once more to what Dr Schultze has said of
the Lombards:
Nun mögen auch die Langobarden in Bezug auf Grundstücke früher
eine volksrechtliche Form der Rechtsveränderung gekannt haben,
welche den Act selbst im Augenblick seiner Vornahme denTrust and Corporation/17
Volksgenossen in genügenden Masse kundthat. In der trier
interessirenden Zeit war aber bei weirem vorherrschend und wurde
jedenfalls bei den ordentlichen Vergabungen auf den Todesfall,
auch denjenigen zu treuer Hand, ausschliesslich angewendet die
Form der traditio cartae.22
With some modifications, which it would be long to explain and
which for our purpose are not very important, these words are true of
the England in which the Trust was born and are yet truer of modern
England. The buyer before he pays the price and obtains the land will
investigate the seller’s title. He will ask for and examine the Urkunden
(“deeds”) which prove that the seller is owner, and unless the contract is
specially worded, the seller of land is under a very onerous duty of
demonstrating his ownership. This Rechtssitte, as Dr Schultze calls it,
enabled the Chancery to set up an external and objective standard of
diligence for purchasers of land: namely the conduct of a prudent pur-
chaser. The man who took a conveyance of land might be supposed to
know (and he had “constructive notice”) of all such rights of destinatories
as would have come to his knowledge if he had acted as a prudent pur-
chaser would in his own interest have acted. “Kümmerte er sich aber
der Rechtssitte zuwider nicht um die Erwerbsurkunden...der ihm etwa
daraus erwachsende Schade traf ihn nicht unverschuldet.” Quite so. Such
a purchaser himself became a trustee. We might say that he became a
trustee ex delicto vel quasi. If not guilty of dolus, he was guilty of that
sort of negligence which is equivalent to dolus. He had shut his eyes in
order that he might not see.
A truly dingliches Recht the Chancellor could not create. The trustee
is owner. It had to be admitted that if the purchaser who acquired own-
ership from the trustee was, not only ignorant, but excusably ignorant
of the rights of the destinatory, then he must be left to enjoy the owner-
ship that he had obtained. If he had acted as a prudent purchaser, as the
reasonable man behaves, then “his conscience was unaffected” and the
Chancellor’s Equity had no hold upon him. But the Court of Chancery
screwed up the standard of diligence ever higher and higher. The judges
who sat in that Court were experts in the creation of trusts. We might
say that they could smell a trust a long way off, and they were apt to
attribute to every reasonable man their own keen scent. They were apt
to attribute to him a constructive notice of all those facts which he would
have discovered if he had followed up every trail that was suggested by
those Erwerbsurkunden that he had seen or ought to have seen.18/Frederic Maitland
Of late years there has been some reaction in favour of purchasers.
The standard, we are told, is not to be raised yet higher and perhaps it is
being slightly lowered. Still it is very hard for any man to acquire land
in England without acquiring “constructive notice” of every trust that
affects that land. I might almost say that this never happens except when
some trustee has committed the grave crime of forgery.
It remains to be observed that a strong line was drawn in this as in
other respects between the entgeltliche and the unentgeltliche Handlung.
A man who acquired the land from the trustee without giving “value”
for it was bound by the trust, even if at the time of acquisition he had no
notice of it. It would be “against conscience” for him to retain the gift
after he knew that it had been made in breach of trust. It was only the
“purchaser for value” who could disregard the claims of the destinatory.
Also we see it established that the creditors of the trustee cannot
exact payment of their debts out of the property that he holds in trust.
And on the other hand the creditors of the destinatory can regard that
property as part of his wealth. If we suppose that there is bankruptcy on
both sides, this property will be divided, not among the creditors of the
trustee but among the creditors of the destinatory. This, it need hardly
be said, is an important point.
To produce all these results took a long time. The Billigkeitsrecht
of the new Court moved slowly forward from precedent to precedent:
but always towards one goal: namely, the strengthening at every point
of the right of the destinatory. In our present context it may, for ex-
ample, be interesting to notice that at one time it was currently said that
the right of the destinatory could not be enforced against a corporation
which had acquired the land, for a corporation has no conscience, and
conscience is the basis of the equitable jurisdiction. But this precious
deduction from the foreign Fiktionstheorie was long ago ignored, and it
is the commonest thing to see a corporation as Treuhänder.
But perhaps the evolution of this Rechtsinstitut may be best seen in
another quarter. To a modern Englishman it would seem plainly unjust
and indeed intolerable that, if a sole trustee died intestate and without an
heir, the rights of the destinatory should perish. And on the other hand it
might seem to him unnatural that if the destinatory, “the owner of this
land died intestate and without an heir, the trustee should thenceforward
hold the land for his own benefit. But the Court, working merely with
the idea of good conscience, could not attain what we now regard as the
right result. In the first case (trustee’s death) the land fell back (escheat)Trust and Corporation/19
to the King or to some other feudal lord. He did not claim any right
through the trustee or through the creator of the trust, and equity had no
hold upon him, for his conscience was clean.23 In the second case
(destinatory’s death), the trust was at an end. The trustee was owner,
and there was no more to be said. The King or the feudal lord was not a
destinatory. In both respects, however, modern legislation has reversed
these old rules.
Thus we come by the idea of an “equitable ownership” or “owner-
ship in equity.” Supposing that a man is in equity the owner (“tenant in
fee simple”) of a piece of land, it makes very little difference to him that
he is not also “owner at law” and that, as we say, “the legal ownership
is outstanding in trustees.” The only serious danger that he is incurring
is that this “legal ownership” may come to a person who acquires it
bona fide, for value, and without actual or constructive notice of his
rights. And that is an uncommon event. It is an event of which practical
lawyers must often be thinking when they give advice or compose docu-
ments; but still it is an uncommon event. I believe that for the ordinary
thought of Englishmen “equitable ownership’‘ is just ownership pure
and simple, though it is subject to a peculiar, technical and not very
intelligible rule in favour of bona fide purchasers. A professor of law
will tell his pupils that they must not think, or at any rate must not begin
by thinking, in this manner. He may tell them that the destinatory’s rights
are in history and in ultimate analysis not dinglich but obligatorisch:
that they are valid only against those who for some special reason are
bound to respect them. But let the Herr Professor say what he likes, so
many persons are bound to respect these rights that practically they are
almost as valuable as if they were dominium.24
This is not all. Let us suppose that the thing that is held upon trust
passes into the hands of one against whom the trust cannot be enforced.
This may happen with land; it may more easily happen in the case of
movables, because (for the reason that Dr Schultze has given) the Court
could not extend its doctrine of constructive notice to traffic in mov-
ables. Now can we do no more for our destinatory than give him a mere
Schadenersatzklage against the dishonest trustee? That will not always
be a very effectual remedy. Dishonest people are often impecunious,
insolvent people.
The Court of Chancery managed to do something more for its dar-
ling. What it did I cannot well describe in abstract terms, but perhaps I
may say that it converted the “trust fund” into an incorporeal thing,20/Frederic Maitland
capable of being “invested” in different ways. Observe that metaphor of
“investment.” We conceive that the “trust fund” can change its dress,
but maintain its identity. To-day it appears as a piece of land; tomorrow
it may be some gold coins in a purse; then it will be a sum of Consols;
then it will be shares in a Railway Company, and then Peruvian Bonds.
When all is going well, changes of investment may often be made; the
trustees have been given power to make them. All along the “trust fund”
retains its identity. “Pretium succedit in locum rei,” we might say, “et
res succedit in locum pretii.” But the same idea is applied even when all
is not going well. Suppose that a trustee sells land meaning to misappro-
priate the price. The price is paid to him in the shape of a bank-note
which is now in his pocket. That bank-note belongs “in equity” to the
destinatories. He pays it away as the price of shares in a company; those
shares belong “in equity” to the destinatories. He becomes bankrupt;
those shares will not be part of the property that is divisible among his
creditors; they will belong to the destinatories. And then, again, if the
trustee mixes “trust money” with his own money, we are taught to say
that, so long as this is possible, we must suppose him to be an honest
man and to be spending, not other people’s money, but his own This
idea of a “trust fund” that can be traced from investment to investment
does not always work very easily, and for my own part I think it does
scanty justice to the claims of the trustee’s creditors. But it is an impor-
tant part of our system. The Court of Chancery struggled hard to pre-
vent its darling, the destinatory, from falling to the level of a mere credi-
tor. And it should be understood that he may often have more than one
remedy. He may be able both to pursue a piece of land and to attack the
trustee who alienated it. It is not for others to say in what order he shall
use his rights, so long as he has not got what he lost or an equivalent for
it.
To complete the picture we must add that a very high degree not
only of honesty but of diligence has been required of trustees. In com-
mon opinion it has been too high, and of late our legislature, without
definitely lowering it, has given the courts a discretionary power of deal-
ing mercifully with honest men who have made mistakes or acted un-
wisely. The honest man brought to ruin by the commission of “a techni-
cal breach of trust,” brought to ruin at the suit of his friend’s children,
has in the past been only too common a figure in English life. On the
other hand, it was not until lately that the dishonest trustee who misap-
propriated money or other movables could be treated as a criminal.Trust and Corporation/21
Naturally there was a difficulty here, for “at law” the trustee was owner,
and a man cannot be guilty of stealing what he both owns and pos-
sesses. But for half a century we have known the criminal breach of
trust, and, though we do not call it theft, it can be severely punished.
Altogether it is certainly not of inadequate protection that a foreign
jurist would speak if he examined the position of our destinatory. Rather
I should suppose that he would say that this lucky being, the spoilt child
of English jurisprudence, has been favoured at the expense of principles
and distinctions that ought to have been held sacred. At any rate, those
who would understand how our “unincorporate bodies” have lived and
flourished behind a hedge of trustees should understand that the right of
the destinatory, though we must not call it a true dominium rei, is some-
thing far better than the mere benefit of a promise.
IV
To describe even in outline the various uses to which our Trust has been
put would require many pages. As we all know, when once a
Rechtsinstitut has been established, it does not perish or become atro-
phied merely because its original function becomes unnecessary. Trusts
may be instituted because landowners want to make testaments but can-
not make testaments. A statute gives them the power to make testa-
ments; but by this time the trust has found other work to do and does not
die. There is a long and very difficult story to be told about the action of
Henry VIII. He was losing his feudal revenue and struck a blow which
did a good deal of harm, and harm which we feel at the present day. But
in such a survey as the present what he did looks like an ineffectual
attempt to dam a mighty current. The stream sweeps onward, carrying
some rubbish with it.
Soon the Trust became very busy. For a while its chief employment
was “the family settlement.” Of “the family settlement” I must say no
word, except this, that the trust thus entered the service of a wealthy and
powerful class: the class of great landowners who could command the
best legal advice and the highest technical skill. Whether we like the
result or not, we must confess that skill of a very high order was applied
to the construction of these “settlements” of great landed estates. Every-
thing that foresight could do was done to define the duties of the trust-
ees. Sometimes they would be, as in the early cases, the mere depositar-
ies of a nude dominium, bound only to keep it until it was asked for. At
other times they would have many and complex duties to perform and22/Frederic Maitland
wide discretionary powers. And then, if I may so speak, the “settle-
ment” descended from above: descended from the landed aristocracy to
the rising monied class, until at last it was quite uncommon for any man
or woman of any considerable wealth to marry without a “marriage
settlement.” Trusts of money or of invested funds became as usual as
trusts of land. It may be worthy of notice that this was, at least in part,
the effect of an extreme degree of testamentary freedom. Our law had
got rid of the Pftichttheil altogether, and trusts in favour of the children
of the projected marriage were a sort of substitute for it. However, in
this region, what we have here to notice is that the trust became one of
the commonest institutes of English law. Almost every well-to-do man
was a trustee; and though the usual trusts might fall under a few great
headings, still all the details (which had to be punctually observed) were
to be found in lengthy documents; and a large liberty of constructing
unusual trusts was both conceded in law and exercised in fact. To clas-
sify trusts is like classifying contracts.
I am well aware that all this has its dark side, and I do not claim
admiration for it. But it should not escape us that a very wide field was
secured for what I may call social experimentation. Let me give one
example. In 1882 a revolutionary change was made in our eheliches
Güterrecht. But this was no leap in the dark. It had been preceded by a
prolonged course of experimentation. Our law about this matter had
become osseous at an early time, and, especially as regards Fahrnis,
was extremely unfavourable to the wife. There was no Gemeinschaft.
The bride’s movables became the husband’s; if the wife acquired, she
acquired for her husband. Now eheliches Güterrecht, when once it has
taken a definite shape, will not easily be altered. Legislators are not
easily persuaded to touch so vital a point, and we cannot readily con-
ceive that large changes can be gradually made by the practice of the
courts. You cannot transfer ownership from the husband to the wife by
slow degrees.
But here the Trust comes to our help. We are not now talking of
ownership strictly so called. Some trustees are to be owners. We are
only going to speak of their duties. What is to prevent us, if we use
words enough, from binding them to pay the income of a fund into the
very hands of the wife and to take her written receipt for it? But the
wedge was in, and it could be driven home. It was a long process; but
one successful experiment followed another. At length the time came
when four well-tested words (“for her separate use”) would give a mar-Trust and Corporation/23
ried woman a Vermögen of which she was the complete mistress “in
equity”; and if there was no other trustee appointed, her husband had to
be trustee. Then, rightly or wrongly we came to the conclusion that all
this experimentation had led to satisfactory results. Our law of husband
and wife was revolutionized. But great as was the change, it was in fact
little more than the extension to all marriages of rules which had long
been applied to the marriages of the well-to-do.
But the liberty of action and experimentation that has been secured
to us by the Trust is best seen in the freedom with which from a remote
time until the present day Anstalten and Stiftungen of all sorts and kinds
had been created by Englishmen.
Whether our law knows or ever has known what foreign lawyers
would call a selbstständige Anstalt might be a vexed question among
us, if we had—but we have not—any turn for juristic speculation. For
some centuries we have kept among our technical notions that of a “cor-
poration sole.” Applied in the first instance to the parson of a parish
church (rector ecclesiae parochialis) we have since the Reformation
applied it also to bishops and to certain other ecclesiastical dignitaries.
We have endeavoured to apply it also—much to our own disadvantage,
so I think,—to our King or to the Crown; and in modern times we have
been told by Gesetz that we ought to apply it to a few officers of the
central government, e.g., the Postmaster-general. It seems to me a most
unhappy notion: an attempt at personification that has not succeeded.
Upon examination, our “corporation sole” turns out to be either a natu-
ral man or a juristic abortion: a sort of hybrid between Anstalt and
Mensch. Our medieval lawyers were staunch realists. They would at-
tribute the ownership of land to a man or to a body of men, but they
would not attribute it to anything so unsubstantial as a personified
ecclesia or a personified dignitas. Rather they would say that when the
rector of a parish church died there was an interval during which the
gleba ecclesiae was herrenlos. The Eigenthum, they said, was “in
nubilous,” or “in gremio legis”; it existed only “en abéance”; that is “in
spe.” And I do not think that an English lawyer is entitled to say that this
is not our orthodox theory at the present day. Practically the question is
of no importance. For a long time past this part of our law has ceased to
grow, and I hope that we are not destined to see any new “corporations
sole.”
We have had no need to cultivate the idea of a selbstständige Anstalt,
because with us the unselbstständige Anstalt has long been a highly24/Frederic Maitland
developed and flourishing Rechtsinstitut. I believe that the English term
which most closely corresponds to the Anstalt or the Stiftung of German
legal literature is “a charity.” It is very possible that our concept of “a
charity” would not cover every Anstalt or Stiftung that is known to
German lawyers: but it is and from a remote time has been enormously
wide. For example, one of our courts had lately to decide that the mere
encouragement of sport is not “charity.” The annual giving of a prize to
be competed for in a yacht-race is not a “charitable” purpose. On the
other hand, “the total suppression of vivisection” is a charitable pur-
pose, though it implies the repeal of an Act of Parliament, and though
the judge who decides this question may be fully persuaded that this so-
called “charity” will do much more harm than good. English judges
have carefully refrained from any exact definition of a “charity”; but
perhaps we may say that any Zweck which any reasonable person could
regard as directly beneficial to the public or to some large and indefinite
class of men is a “charitable” purpose. Some exception should be made
of trusts which would fly in the face of morality or religion; but judges
who were themselves stout adherents of the State Church have had to
uphold as “charitable,” trusts which involved the maintenance of Ca-
tholicism, Presbyterianism, Judaism.
To the enforcement of charitable trusts we came in a very natural
way and at an early date. A trust for persons shades off, we might say,
into a trust for a Zweck. We are not, it will be remembered, speaking of
true ownership. Ownership supposes an owner. We cannot put owner-
ship into an indefinite mass of men; and, according to our English ideas,
we cannot put ownership into a Zweck. I should say that there are vast
masses of Zweckvermögen in England, but the owner is always man or
corporation. As regards the trust, however, transitions are easy. You
may start with a trust for the education of my son and for his education
in a particular manner. It is easy to pass from this by slow degrees to the
education of the boys of the neighbourhood, though in the process of
transition the definite destinatory may disappear and leave only a Zweck
behind him.25
At any rate, in 1601 there was already a vast mass of Zweckvermögen
in the country; a very large number of unselbstständige Stiftungen had
come into existence. A famous Gesetz of that year became the basis of
our law of Charitable Trusts, and their creation was directly encour-
aged. There being no problem about personality to be solved, the courts
for a long while showed every favour to the authors of “charitable”Trust and Corporation/25
trusts. In particular, it was settled that where there was a “charitable”
Zweck there was to be no trouble about “perpetuity.” The exact import
of this remark could not be explained in two or three words. But, as
might be supposed, even the Englishman, when he is making a trust of
the ordinary private kind, finds that the law sets some limits to his power
of bestowing benefits upon a long series of unborn destinatories; and
these limits are formulated in what we know as “the rule against perpe-
tuities.” Well, it was settled that where there is “charity,” there can be
no trouble about “perpetuity.”26
It will occur to my readers that it must have been necessary for
English lawyers to make or to find some juristic person in whom the
benefit of the “charitable” trust would inhere and who would be the
destinatory. But that is not true. It will be understood that in external
litigation—e.g., if there were an adverse claim to a piece of land held by
the trustees—the interests of the trust would be fully represented by the
trustees. Then if it were necessary to take proceedings against the trust-
ees to compel them to observe the trust, the Reichsanwalt (Attorney-
General) would appear. We find it said long ago that it is for the King
“ut parens patriae” to intervene for this purpose. But we have stopped
far short of any theory which would make the State into the true
destinatory (cestui que trust) of all charitable trusts. Catholics,
Wesleyans, Jews would certainly be surprised if they were told that their
cathedrals, chapels, synagogues were in any sense Staatsvermögen. We
are not good at making juristic theories, but of the various concepts that
seem to be offered to us by German books, it seems to me that
Zweckvermögen is that which most nearly corresponds to our way of
thinking about our “charities.”
That great abuses took place in this matter of charitable trusts is
undeniable. Slowly we were convinced by sad experience that in the
way of supervision something more was necessary than the mere ad-
ministration of the law (technically of “equity”) at the instance of a
Staatsanwalt who was casually set in motion by some person who hap-
pened to see that the trustees were not doing their duty. Since 1853 such
supervision has been supplied by a central Behörde (the Charity Com-
missioners); but it is much rather supervision than control, and, so far
from any check being placed on the creation of new Stiftungen, we in
1891 repealed a law which since 1736 had prevented men from giving
land to “charity” by testament.27
I understand that in the case of an unselbstständige Stiftung Ger-26/Frederic Maitland
man legal doctrine knows a Treuhänder or Fiduziar, who in many re-
spects would resemble our trustee, and I think that I might bring to light
an important point by quoting some words that I read in Dr Regelsberger’s
Pandekten:
Es hat ferner die Ansicht gute Gründe fur sich, class das
Zwockvermögen dem Zugriff von Gläubigern des Fiduziars
entrückt ist, deren Ansprüche nicht aus dem Zweckvermögen
erwachsen sind, class ferner im Konkurs des Fiduziars oder bei
Verhängung einer Vermögenseinziehung fur das Zweckvermögen
ein Aussonderungsrecht in Anspruch genommen werden kann,
da der Empfänger zwar Rechtsträger, aber nur im fremden Inter-
esse ist.28
Now in England these would not be probable opinions they would
be obvious and elementary truths. The trustee’s creditors have nothing
whatever to do with the trust property. Our unselbstständige Anstalt
lives behind a wall that was erected in the interests of the richest and
most powerful class of Englishmen: it is as safe as the duke and the
millionaire.
But the wall will need repairs.
Das Rechtssubject, dem bei einer unselbstständigen Gründung das
Zweckvermögen zugewendet wird, ist (says Dr Regelsberger) in
der Regel eine juristische Person, denn nur sie bietet einen
dauernden Stützpunkt.29
We have not found that to be true. Doubtless a corporation is, be-
cause of its permanence, a convenient trustee. But it is a matter of con-
venience. By means of the Germanic Gesammthandschaft and of a power
given to the surviving trustees—or perhaps to some destinatories, or
perhaps to other people (e.g., the catholic bishop of the diocese for the
time being)—of appointing new trustees, a great deal of permanence
can be obtained at a cost that is not serious if the property is of any
considerable value. Extreme cases, such as that of a sole trustee who is
wandering about in Central Africa with the ownership of some English
land in his nomadic person, can be met by an order of the Court (“a
vesting order”) taking the ownership out of him and putting it in some
more accessible receptacle. We have spent a great deal of pains over this
matter. I am far from saying that all our devices are elegant. On juristicTrust and Corporation/27
elegance we do not pride ourselves, but we know how to keep the roof
weather-tight.
And here it should be observed that many reformers of our “chari-
ties” have deliberately preferred that “charitable trusts” should be con-
fided, not to corporations, but to “natural persons.” It is said—and ap-
peal is made to long experience—that men are more conscientious when
they are doing acts in their own names than when they are using the
name of a corporation. In consequence of this prevailing opinion, all
sorts of expedients have been devised by Parliament for simplifying and
cheapening those transitions of Eigenthum which are inevitable where
mortal men are the Stützpunkt of an unselbstständige Stiftung. Some of
these would shock a theorist. In the case of certain places of worship,
we may see the dominium taken out of one set of men and put into
another set of men by the mere vote of an assembly—an unincorporated
congregation of Nonconformists.30 Of course no rules of merely private
law can explain this; but that does not trouble us.
This brings us to a point at which the Trust performed a signal
service. All that we English people mean by “religious liberty” has been
intimately connected with the making of trusts. When the time for a
little toleration had come, there was the Trust ready to provide all that
was needed by the barely tolerated sects. All that they had to ask from
the State was that the open preaching of their doctrines should not be
unlawful.
By way of contrast I may be allowed to cite a few words written by
Dr Hinschius:31
Das frühere Staatskirchenthum konnte, als es in Folge der
veränderten Verhältnisse neben der herrschenden Kirche noch
einzelne andere Religionsgesellschaften zu dulden anfing, diese
nicht als reine Privatvereine gelten lessen, da es die Religion als
Staatssache ansah. Vielmehr musste es aus diesem Grunde zu dem
Standpunkte gelangen, solche Genosserlschaften in gewissem
Umfange als Korporationen mit öffentlichen Rechten zu behandeln,
sie aber andererseits weitgehenden staadichen Kontrollen und
staatlichen Eingriffen zu unterwerfen.32
But just what, according to Dr Hinschius, could not be done, was in
England the easy and obvious thing to do. If in 1688 the choice had lain
between conceding no toleration at all and forming corporations of Non-
conformists, and even “Korporationen mit öffentlichen Rechten,” there28/Frederic Maitland
can be little doubt that “das herrschende Staatskirchenthum” would have
left them untolerated for a long time to come, for in England, as else-
where, incorporation meant privilege and exceptional favour. And, on
the other hand, there were among the Nonconformists many who would
have thought that even toleration was dearly purchased if their religious
affairs were subjected to State control. But if the State could be per-
suaded to do the very minimum, to repeal a few persecuting laws, to say
“You shall not be punished for not going to the parish church, and you
shall not be punished for going to your meeting-house,” that was all that
was requisite. Trust would do the rest, and the State and das
Steatskirchenthum could not be accused of any active participation in
heresy and schism. Trust soon did the rest. I have been told that some of
the earliest trust deeds of Nonconformist “meeting-houses” say what is
to be done with the buildings if the Toleration Act be repealed. After a
little hesitation, the courts enforced these trusts, and even held that they
were “charitable.”
And now we have in England Jewish synagogues and Catholic ca-
thedrals and the churches and chapels of countless sects. They are owned
by natural persons. They are owned by trustees.
Now I know very well that our way of dealing with all the churches,
except that which is “by law established” (and in America and the great
English colonies even that exception need not be made), looks grotesque
to some of those who see it from the outside. They are surprised when
they learn that such an “historic organism” as the Church of Rome,
“einem Privatverein, einer Ballspielgesellschaft rechtlich gleichsteht.”33
But when they have done laughing at us, the upshot of their complaint
or their warning is, not that we have not made this historic organism
comfortable enough, but that we have made it too comfortable.
I have spoken of our “charity” as an Anstalt or Stiftung; but, as
might be expected in a land where men have been very free to create
such “charitable trusts” as they pleased, anstaltliche and
genossenschaftliche threads have been interwoven in every conceivable
fashion. And this has been so from the very first. In dealing with chari-
table trusts one by one, our Courts have not been compelled to make
any severe classification. Anstalt or Genossenschaft was not a dilemma
which every trust had to face, though I suppose that what would be
called an anstaltliches Element is implicit in our notion of a charity.
This seems particularly noticeable in the ecclesiastical region. There is
a piece of ground with a building on it which is used as a place ofTrust and Corporation/29
worship. Who or  what is it that in this instance stands behind the trust-
ees? Shall we say Anstalt or shall we say Verein?
No general answer could be given. We must look at the “trust deed.”
We may find that as a matter of fact the trustees are little better than
automata whose springs are controlled by the catholic bishop, or by the
central council (“Conference”) of the Wesleyans; or we may find that
the trustees themselves have wide discretionary powers. A certain amount
of Zweck there must be, for otherwise the trust would not be “chari-
table.” But this demand is satisfied by the fact that the building is to be
used for public worship. If, however, we raise the question who shall
preach here, what shall he preach, who shall appoint, who shall dismiss
him, then we are face to face with almost every conceivable type of
organization from centralized and absolute monarchy to decentralized
democracy and the autonomy of the independent congregation. To say
nothing of the Catholics, it is well known that our Protestant Noncon-
formists have differed from each other much rather about Church gov-
ernment than about theological dogma: but all of them have found satis-
faction for their various ideals of ecclesiastical polity under the shadow
of our trusts.
V
This brings us to our “unincorporated bodies,” and by way of a first
example I should like to mention the Wesleyans. They have a very elabo-
rate and a highly centralized constitution, the primary outlines of which
are to be found in an Urkunde to which John Wesley set his seal in 1784.
Thereby he declared the trusts upon which he was holding certain lands
and buildings that had been conveyed to him in various parts of En-
gland. Now-a-days we see Wesleyan chapels in all our towns and in
many of our villages. Generally every chapel has its separate set of
trustees, but the trust deeds all follow one model, devised by a famous
lawyer in 1832—the printed copy that lies before me fills more than
forty pages—and these deeds institute a form of government so central-
ized that Rome might be proud of it, though the central organ is no
pope, but a council.
But we must not dwell any longer on cases in which there is a “chari-
table trust,” for, as already said, there is in these cases no pressing
demand for a personal destinatory. We can, if we please, think of the
charitable Zweck as filling the place that is filled by a person in the
ordinary private trust. When, however, we leave behind us the province,30/Frederic Maitland
the wide province, of “charity,” then—so we might argue a priori—a
question about personality must arise. There will here be no Zweck that
is protected as being “beneficial to the public.”  There will here be no
intervention of a Staatsanwalt who represents the “parens patriae.” Must
there not therefore be some destinatory who is either a natural or else a
juristic person? Can we have a trust for a Genossenschaft, unless it is
endowed with personality, or unless it is steadily regarded as being a
mere collective name for certain natural persons? I believe that our an-
swer should be that in theory we cannot, but that in practice we can. If
then we ask how there can be this divergence between theory and prac-
tice, we come upon what has to my mind been the chief merit of the
Trust. It has served to protect the unincorporated Genossenschaft against
the attacks of inadequate and individualistic theories.
We should all agree that, if an Anstalt or a Genossenschaft is to live
and thrive, it must be efficiently defended by law against external en-
emies. On the other hand, experience seems to show that it can live and
thrive, although the only theories that lawyers hold about its internal
affairs are inadequate. Let me dwell for a moment on both of these
truths.
Our Anstalt, or our Genossenschaft, or whatever it may be, has to
live in a wicked world: a world full of thieves and rogues and other bad
people. And apart from wickedness, there will be unfounded claims to
be resisted: claims made by neighbours, claims made by the State. This
sensitive being must have a hard, exterior shell. Now our Trust provides
this hard, exterior shell for whatever lies within. If there is theft, the
thief will be accused of stealing the goods of Mr A. B. and Mr C. D.,
and not one word will be said of the trust. If there is a dispute about a
boundary, Mr A. B. and Mr C. D. will bring or defend the action. It is
here to be remembered that during the age in which the Trust was taking
shape all this external litigation went on before courts where nothing
could be said about trusts. The judges in those courts, if I may so say,
could only see the wall of trustees and could see nothing that lay beyond
it. Thus in a conflict with an external foe no question about personality
could arise. A great deal of ingenuity had been spent in bringing about
this result.
But if there be this hard exterior shell, then there is no longer any
pressing demand for juristic theory. Years may pass by, decades, even
centuries, before jurisprudence is called upon to decide exactly what it
is that lies within the shell. And if what lies within is someTrust and Corporation/31
Genossenschaft, it may slowly and silently change its shape many times
before it is compelled to explain its constitution to a public tribunal.
Disputes there will be; but the disputants will be very unwilling to call
in the policeman. This unwillingness may reach its highest point in the
case of religious bodies. Englishmen are a litigious race, and religious
people have always plenty to quarel about. Still they are very reluctant
to seek the judgment seat of Gallio. As is well known, our “Law Re-
ports,” beginning in the day of Edward I, are a mountainous mass. Al-
most every side of English life is revealed in them. But if you search
them through in the hope of discovering the organization of our churches
and sects (other than the established church) you will find only a few
widely scattered hints. And what is true of religious bodies, is hardly
less true of many other Vereine, such as our “clubs.” Even the
“kampflustige Engländer,” whom Ihering admired, would, as we say,
think once, twice, thrice, before he appealed to a court of law against
the decision of the committee or the general meeting. I say “appealed,”
and believe that this is the word that he would use, for the thought of a
“jurisdiction” inherent in the Genossenschaft is strong in us, and I be-
lieve that it is at its strongest where there is no formal corporation. And
so, the external wall being kept in good repair, our English legal Dogmatik
may have no theory or a wholly inadequate and antiquated theory of
what goes on behind. And to some of us that seems a desirable state of
affairs. Shameful though it may be to say this, we fear the petrifying
action of juristic theory.
And now may I name a few typical instances of “unincorporated
bodies” that have lived behind the trustee wall?
I imagine a foreign tourist, with Bädeker in hand, visiting one of our
“Inns of Court”: let us say Lincoln’s Inn.34 He sees the chapel and the
library and the dining-hall; he sees the external gates that are shut at
night. It is in many respects much like such colleges as he may see at
Oxford and Cambridge. On inquiry he hears of an ancient constitution
that had taken shape before 1422, and we know not how much earlier.
He learns that something in the way of legal education is being done by
these Inns of Court, and that for this purpose a federal organ, a Council
of Legal Education, has been established. He learns that no man can
practice as an advocate in any of the higher courts who is not a member
of one of the four Inns and who has not there received the degree of
“barrister-at-law.” He would learn that these Inns have been very free to
dictate the terms upon which this degree is given. He would learn that32/Frederic Maitland
the Inn has in its hands a terrible, if rarely exercised, power of expelling
(“disbarring”) a member for dishonourable or unprofessional conduct,
of excluding him from the courts in which he has been making his liv-
ing, of ruining him and disgracing him. He would learn that in such a
case there might be an appeal to the judges of our High Court: but not to
them as a public tribunal: to them as “visitors” and as constituting, we
might say, a second instance of the domestic forum.
Well, he might say, apparently we have some curious hybrid—and
we must expect such things in England—between an Anstalt des
öffentlichen Rechtes and a privilegierte Korporation. Nothing of the
sort, an English friend would reply; you have here a Privatverein which
has not even juristic personality. It might—such at least our theory has
been—dissolve itself tomorrow, and its members might divide the prop-
erty that is held for them by trustees. And indeed there was until lately
an Inn of a somewhat similar character, the ancient Inn of the “Serjeants
at Law,” and, as there were to be no more serjeants, its members dis-
solved the Verein and divided their property. Many people thought that
this dissolution of an ancient society was to be regretted; there was a
little war in the newspapers about it; but as to the legal right we were
told that there was no doubt.
It need hardly be said that the case of these Inns of Court is in a
certain sense anomalous. Such powers as they wield could not be ac-
quired at the present day by any Privatverein, and it would not be too
much to say that we do not exactly know how or when those powers
were acquired, for the beginning of these societies of lawyers was very
humble and is very dark. But, before we leave them, let us remember
that the English judges who received and repeated a great deal of the
canonistic learning about corporations, Fiktionstheorie,
Concessionstheorie and so forth, were to a man members of these
Körperschaften and had never found that the want of juristic personal-
ity was a serious misfortune. Our lawyers were rich and influential people.
They could easily have obtained incorporation had they desired it. They
did not desire it.
But let us come to modern cases. To-day German ships and Aus-
trian ships are carrying into all the seas the name of the keeper of a
coffee-house, the name of Edward Lloyd. At the end of the seventeenth
century he kept a coffee-house in the City of London, which was fre-
quented by “underwriters” or marine insurers. Now from 1720 onwards
these men had to do their business in the most purely individualisticTrust and Corporation/33
fashion. In order to protect two privileged corporations, which had lent
money to the State, even a simple Gesellschaft among underwriters was
forbidden. Every insurer had to act for himself and for himself only. We
might not expect to see such individualistic units coalescing so as to
form a compactly organized body—and this too not in the Middle Age
but in the eighteenth century. However, these men had common inter-
ests: an interest in obtaining Information, an interest in exposing fraud
and resisting fraudulent claims. There was a subscription; there was a
small “trust fund”; the exclusive use of the “coffee house” was obtained.
The Verein grew and grew. During the great wars of the Napoleonic
age, “the Committee for regulating the affairs of Lloyd’s Coffee House”
became a great power. But the organization was still very loose until
1811, when a trust deed was executed and bore more than eleven hun-
dred signatures. I must not attempt to tell all that “Lloyd’s” has done for
England. The story should be the better known in Germany, because the
hero of it, J. J. Angerstein, though he came to us from Russia, was of
German parentage. But until 1871 Lloyd’s was an unincorporated Verein
without the least trace (at least so we said) of juristic personality about
it. And when incorporation came in 1871, the chief reason for the change
was to be found in no ordinary event, but in the recovery from the bot-
tom of the Zuyder Zee of a large mass of treasure which had been lying
there since 1799, and Which belonged—well, owing to the destruction
of records by an accidental fire, no one could exactly say to whom it
belonged. In the life of such a Verein “incorporation” appears as a mere
event. We could not even compare it to the attainment of full age. Rather
it is as if a “natural person” bought a type-writing machine or took
lessons in stenography.35
Even more instructive is the story of the London Stock Exchange.36
Here also we see small beginnings. In the eighteenth century the men
who deal in stocks frequent certain coffee-houses: in particular
“Jonathan’s.” They begin to form a club. They pay the owner an annual
sum to exclude those whom they have not elected into their society. In
1773 they moved to more commodious rooms. Those who used the rooms
paid sixpence a day. In 1802 a costly site was bought, a costly building
erected, and an elaborate constitution was formulated in a “deed of settle-
ment.” There was a capital of £20,000 divided into 400 shares. Behind
the trustees stood a body of “proprietors,” who had found the money;
and behind the “proprietors” stood a much larger body of “members,”
whose subscriptions formed the income that was divided among the34/Frederic Maitland
“proprietors.” And then there was building and always more building.
In 1876 there was a new “deed of settlement”; in 1882 large changes
were made in it; there was a capital of £240,000 divided into 20,000
shares.
Into details we must not enter. Suffice it that the organization is of a
high type. It might, for example, strike one at first that the shares of the
“proprietors” would, by the natural operation of private law, be often
passing into the hands of people who were in no wise interested in the
sort of business that is done on the Stock Exchange, and that thus the
genossenschaftliche character of the constitution would be destroyed.
But that danger could be obviated. There was nothing to prevent the
original subscribers from agreeing that the shares could only be sold to
members of the Stock Exchange, and that, if by inheritance a share
came to other hands, it must be sold within a twelvemonth. Such regula-
tions have not prevented the shares from being valuable.
In 1877 a Royal Commission was appointed to consider the Stock
Exchange. It heard evidence; it issued a report; it made recommenda-
tions. A majority of its members recommended that the Stock Exchange
should be incorporated by royal charter or Act of Parliament.
And so the Stock Exchange was incorporated? Certainly not. In
England you cannot incorporate people who do not want incorporation,
and the members of the Stock Exchange did not want it. Something had
been said about the submission of the “bye-laws”of the corporation to
the approval of a central Behörde, the Board of Trade. That was the
cloven hoof. Ex pede diabolum.37
Now, unless we have regard to what an Englishman would call “mere
technicalities,” it would not, I think, be easy to find anything that a
corporation could do and that is not being done by this nicht rechtsfähiger
Verein. It legislates profusely. Its representative among the Royal Com-
missioners did not scruple to speak of “legislation.” And then he told
how it did justice and enforced a higher standard of morality than the
law can reach. And a terrible justice it is.  Expulsion brings with it
disgrace and ruin, and minor punishments are inflicted. In current lan-
guage the committee is said to “pronounce a sentence” of suspension for
a year, or two years or five years.
The “quasi-judicial” power of the body over its members—quasi is
one of the few Latin words that English lawyers really love—is made to
look all the more judicial by the manner in which it is treated by our
courts of law. A man who is expelled from one of our clubs,—or (to useTrust and Corporation/35
a delicate phrase) whose name is removed from the list of members—
will sometimes complain to a public court. That court will insist on a
strict observance of any procedure that is formulated in the written or
printed “rules” of the club; but also there may be talk of “natural jus-
tice.” Thereby is meant an observance of those forms which should
secure for every accused person a full and fair trial. In particular, a
definite accusation should be definitely made, and the accused should
have a sufficient opportunity of meeting it. Whatever the printed rules
may say, it is not easy to be supposed that a man has placed his rights
beyond that protection which should be afforded to all men by “natural
justice.” Theoretically the “rules,” written or unwritten, may only be the
terms of a contract, still the thought that this man is complaining that
justice has been denied to him by those who were bound to do it, often
finds practical expression. The dread of a Vereinsherrschaft is hardly
represented among us.
I believe that in the eyes of a large number of my fellow-country-
men the most important and august tribunal in England is not the House
of Lords but the Jockey Club; and in this case we might see “jurisdic-
tion”—they would use that word—exercised by the Verein over those
who stand outside it. I must not aspire to tell this story. But the begin-
ning of it seems to be that some gentlemen form a club, buy a race-
course, the famous Newmarket Heath, which is conveyed to trustees for
them, and then they can say who shall and who shall not be admitted to
it. I fancy, however, that some men who have been excluded from this
sacred heath (“warned off Newmarket Heath” is our phrase) would have
much preferred the major excommunication of that “historic organism”
the Church of Rome.
It will have been observed that I have been choosing examples from
the eighteenth century: a time when, if I am not mistaken, corporation
theory sat heavy upon mankind in other countries. And we had a theory
in England too, and it was of a very orthodox pattern; but it did not
crush the spirit of association. So much could be done behind a trust,
and the beginnings might be so very humble. All this tended to make our
English jurisprudence disorderly, but also gave to it something of the
character of an experimental science, and that I hope it will never lose.
But surely, it will be said, you must have some juristic theory about
the constitution ofthe Privatrerein: some theory, for example, about your
clubs and those luxurious clubhouses which we see in Pall Mall.
Yes, we have, and it is a purely individualistic theory. This it must36/Frederic Maitland
necessarily be. As there is no “charity” in the case, the trust must be a
trust for persons, and any attempt to make it a trust for unascertained
persons (future members) would soon come into collision with that “rule
against perpetuities” which keeps the Familienfideicommiss within
moderate bounds. So really we have no tools to work with except such
as are well known to all lawyers. Behind the wall of trustees we have
Miteigenthum and Vertrag. We say that “in equity” the original mem-
bers were the only destinatories: they were Miteigenthümer with
Gesammthandschaft; but at the same time they contracted to observe
certain rules.
I do not think that the resultis satisfactory. The “ownership in eq-
uity” that the member ofthe club has in land, buildings, furniture, books,
etc. is of a very strange kind. (1) Practically it is inalienable. (2) Practi-
cally his creditors cannot touch it by execution. (3) Practically, if he is
bankrupt, there is nothing for them.38 (4) It ceases if he does not pay his
annual subscription. (5) It ceases if in accordance with the rules he is
expelled. (6) His share—if of a share we may speak—is diminished
whenever a new member is elected. (7) He cannot demand a partition.
And (8) in order to explain all this, we have to suppose numerous tacit
contracts which no one knows that he is making, for after every election
there must be a fresh contract between the new member and all the old
members. But every judge on the bench is a member of at least one club,
and we know that, if a thousand tacit contracts have to be discovered, a
tolerable result will be attained. We may remember that the State did not
fall to pieces when philosophers and jurists declared that it was the
outcome of contract.
There are some signs that in course of time we may be driven out of
this theory. The State has begun to tax clubs as it taxes corporations.39
When we have laid down as a very general principle that, when a man
gains any property upon the death of another, he must pay something to
the State, it becomes plain to us that the property of a club will escape
this sort of taxation. It would be ridiculous, and indeed impossible, to
hold that, whenever a member of a club dies, some taxable increment of
wealth accrues to every one of his fellows. So the property of the “unin-
corporated body” is to be taxed as if it belonged to a corporation. This
is a step forward. Strange operations with Miteigenthum and Vertrag
must, I should suppose, have been very familiar to German jurists in
days when corporateness was not to be had upon easy terms. But what
I am concerned to remark is that, owing to the hard exterior shell pro-Trust and Corporation/37
vided by a trust, the inadequacy of our theories was seldom brought to
the light of day.
Every now and again a court of law may have a word to say about
a club; but you will find nothing about club-property in our institutional
treatises. And yet the value of those houses in London, their sites and
their contents, is very great, and almost every English lawyer is inter-
ested, personally interested, in one of them.
A comparison between our unincorporated Verein and the
nichtrechtsfahiger Verein of the new German code might be very in-
structive; but perhaps the first difference that would strike anyone who
undertook the task would be this, that, whereas in the German case
almost every conceivable question has been forestalled by scientific and
controversial discussion, there is in the English case very little to be
read. We have a few decisions, dotted about here and there; but they
have to be read with caution, for each decision deals only with some one
type of Verein, and the types are endless. I might perhaps say that no
attempt has been made to provide answers for half the questions that
have been raised, for example, by Dr Gierke. And yet let me repeat that
our Vereine ohne Rechtsfähigheit are very numerous, that some of them
are already old, and that some of them are wealthy.40
One of the points that is clear (and here we differ from the German
code) is that our unincorporated Verein is not to be likened to a
Gesellschaft (partnerhsip): at all events this is not to be done when the
Verein is a “club” of the common type.41 Parenthetically I may observe
that for the present purpose the English for Gesellschaft is “Partner-
ship” and the English for Verein is “Society.” Now in the early days of
clubs an attempt was made to treat the club as a Gesellschaft. The
Gesellschaft was an old well-established institute, and an effort was
made to bring the new creature under the old rubric. That effort has,
however, been definitely abandoned and we are now taught, not only
that the club is not a Gesellschaff, but that you cannot as a general rule
argue from the one to the other. Since 1890 we have a statutory defini-
tion of a Gesellschaft: “Partnership is the relation which subsists be-
tween persons carrying on a business in common with a view of profit.”42
A club would not fall within this definition.
The chief practical interest of this doctrine, that a club is not to be
assimilated to a Gesellschaft, lies in the fact that the committee of an
English club has no general power of contracting on behalfofthe mem-
bers within a sphere marked out by the affairs of the club. A true corpo-38/Frederic Maitland
rate liability could not be manufactured, and, as I shall remark below,
our courts were setting their faces against any attempt to establish a
limited liability. The supposition as regards the club is that the members
pay their subscriptions in advance, and that the committee has ready
money to meet all current expenses. On paper that is not satisfactory. I
believe that cases must pretty frequently occur in which a tradesman
who has supplied wine or books or other goods for the use of the club
would have great difficulty in discovering the other contractor. We have
no such rule (and here again we differ from the German code) as that the
person who professes to act on behalf of an unincorporated Verein al-
ways personally liable;43 and I think the tradesman could often be forced
to admit that he had not given credit to any man, the truth being that he
thought of the club as a person. I can only say that scandals, though not
absolutely unknown,44 have been very rare; that the members of the club
would in all probability treat the case as if it were one of corporate
liability; and that London tradesmen are willing enough to supply goods
to clubs on a large scale. If there is to be extraordinary expenditure, if,
for example, a new wing is to be added to the building, money to a large
amount can often be borrowed at a very moderate rate of interest. We
know a “mortgage without personal liability”; and that has been useful.
Strictly speaking there is no debtor; but the creditor has various ways
by which he can obtain payment: in particular he can sell the land.
Deliktsfähigkeit is an interesting and at the present time it is per-
haps a burning point. A little while ago English lawyers would probably
have denied that anything resembling corporate liability could be estab-
lished in this quarter. Any liability beyond that of the man who does the
unlawful act must be that of a principal for the acts of an agent, or of a
master for the acts of a servant, and if there is any liability at all, it must
be unlimited. But this is now very doubtful. Our highest court (the House
of Lords) has lately held that a trade union is deliktsfähig: in other
words, that the damage done by the organized action of this unincorpo-
rated Verein must be paid for out of the property held by its trustees.
Now a trade union is an unincorporated Verein of a somewhat excep-
tional sort. It is the subject of special Statutes which have conferred
upon it some, but not all, of those legal qualities which we associate
with incorporation. Whether this decision, which made a great noise, is
attributable to this exceptional element, or whether it is to be based
upon a broader ground, is not absolutely plain. The trade unionists are
dissatisfied about this and some other matters, and what the results ofTrust and Corporation/39
their agitation will be I cannot say. The one thing that it is safe to predict
is that in England socialpolitische will take precedence of
rechtswissenschaftliche considerations. As to the broader question, now
that a beginning has once been made, I believe that the situation could
be well described in some words that I will borrow from Dr Gierke:
Vielleicht bildet sich ein Gewohnheitsrecht das die nicht
rechtsfähigen Vereine in Ansehung der Haftung fur widerrechtliche
Schadenszufügung dem Körperschaftsrecht unterstellt.45
The natural inclination of the members of an English club would, so
I think, be to treat the case exactly as if it were a case of corporate
liability. It has often struck me that morally there is most personality
where legally there is none. A man thinks of his club as a living being,
honourable as well as honest, while the joint-stock company is only a
sort of machine into which he puts money and out of which he draws
dividends.
As to the Deliktsfähigkeit of corporations it may not be out of place
to observe that by this time English corporations have had to pay for
almost every kind of wrong that one man can do to another. Thus re-
cently an incorporated company had to pay for having instituted crimi-
nal proceedings against a man “maliciously and without reasonable or
probable cause.” In our theoretical moments we reconcile this with the
Fiktionstheorie by saying that it is a case in which a master (persona
ficta) pays for the act of his servant or a principal for the act of an
agent, and, as our rule about the master’s liability is very wide, the
explanation is not obviously insufficient. I am not sure that this may not
help us to attain the desirable result in the case of the unincorporated
Verein.
Our practical doctrine about the Vermögen of our clubs seems to
me to be very much that which is stated by Dr Gierke in the following
sentence, though (for the reason already given) we should have to omit
a few words in which he refers to a Gesellschaft:46
Das vereinsvermogen... gehört... denjeweiligen Mitgliedern; aber
als Gesellschaftsvermögen [Vereinsvermögen] ist es ein fur den
Gesellschaftszweck [Vereinszweck] aus dem übrigen vermogen der
Theilhaber ausgeschiedenes, den Gesellschaftern [Vereins-
mitgliedern] zu ungesonderten Antheilen gemeinsames
Sondervermögen, das sich einem Körperschaftsvermögen nähert.4740/Frederic Maitland
And then in England the Sonderung of this Vermögen from all the
other Vermögen of the Theilhaber can be all the plainer, because in legal
analysis the owners of this Vermögen are not the Vereinsmitglieder, but
the trustees. It is true that for practical purposes this Eigenthum of the
trustees of a club may be hardly better than a Scheineigenthum, and the
trustees themselves may be hardly better than puppets whose wires are
pulled by the committee and the general meeting. And it is to be ob-
served that in the case of this class of trusts the destinatories are pecu-
liarly well protected, for, even if deeds were forged, no man could say
that he had bought one of our club-houses or a catholic cathedral with-
out suspecting the existence of a trust: res ipsa loquitur. Still the nudum
dominium of the trustees serves as a sort of external mark which keeps
all this Vermögen together as a Sondervermögen. And when we remem-
ber that some great jurists have found it possible to speak of the juristic
person as puppet, a not unimportant analogy is established:
Der verein kann nicht nur unter Lebenden, sondern auch von
Todeswegen erwerben. Denn es besteht kein Hinderniss die
jeweiligen Mitglieder in ihrer gesellschaftlichen [verein-
schaftlichen] Verbundenheit zu Erben einzusetzen oder mit einem
Vermachtniss zu bedenken.48
This is substantially true of our English law, though the words “zu
Erben einzusetzen” do not fit into our system. A little care on the part of
the testator is requisite in such cases in order that he may not be accused
of having endeavoured to create a trust in favour of a long series of
unascertained persons (future members) and of having come into colli-
sion with our “rule against perpetuities.” The less he says the better.
Substantially the Verein is vermächtnissfähig. Dr Gierke’s next sen-
tence also is true, though of course the first word is inappropriate:
[Landesgesetzliche] Einschränkungen des Rechtserwerbes
juristischer Personen können auf nicht rechtsfähige Vereine nicht
erstreckt werden.49
Since our lawyers explained away a certain statute of Henry VIII,
which will be mentioned below, our nicht rechtsfähiger Verein has stood
outside the scope of those Gesetze which forbad corporations to acquire
land (Statutes of Mortmain). And this was at one time a great advantageTrust and Corporation/41
that our niche rechtsfähiger Verein had over the rechtsfähiger Verein.
The Jockey Club, for example, could acquire Newmarket Heath with-
out asking the King’s or the State’s permission. Even at the present day
certain of our nicht rechtsfähige Vereine would lose their power of holding
an unlimited quantity of land if they registered themselves under the
Companies Acts and so became corporations.50
As regards Processfähigkeit, our doctrine regarded the capacity “to
sue and be sued” as one of the essential attributes of the corporation.
Indeed at times this capacity seems to have appeared as the specific
differentia of the corporation, though the common seal also was an im-
portant mark. And with this doctrine we have not openly broken. It will
be understood, however, that in a very large class of disputes the con-
cerns of the nicht rechtsfähiger Verein would be completely represented
by the trustees. Especially would this be the case in all litigation con-
cerning Liegenschaft. Suppose a dispute with a neighbour about a ser-
vitude (“easement”) or about a boundary, this can be brought into court
and decided as if there were no trust in existence and no Verein. And so
if the dispute is with some Pächter or Miether of land or houses that
belong “in equity” to the Verein. There is a legal relationship between
him and the trustees, but none between him and the Verein; and in gen-
eral it will be impossible for him to give trouble by any talk about the
constitution of the Verein. And then as regards internal controversies,
the Court of Chancery developed a highly elastic doctrine about “repre-
sentative suits.” The beginning of this lies far away from the point that
we are considering. It must suffice that in dealing with those compli-
cated trusts that Englishmen are allowed to create, the court was driven
to hold that a class of persons may be sufficiently represented in litiga-
tion by a member of that class. We became familiar with the plaintiff
who was suing “on behalf of himself and all other legatees” or “all other
cousins of the deceased” or “all other creditors.” This practice came to
the aid of the Verein. Our English tendency would be to argue that if in
many cases a mere class (e.g., the testator’s nephews) could be repre-
sented by a specimen, then a fortiori a Verein could be represented by
its “officers.” And we should do this without seeing that we were in-
fringing the corporation’s exclusive possession of Processfähigkeit.51
But with all its imperfections the position of the unincorporate Verein
must be fairly comfortable. There is a simple test that we can apply. For
the last forty years and more almost every Verein could have obtained
the corporate quality had it wished to do this, and upon easy terms.42/Frederic Maitland
When we opened the door we opened it wide. Any seven or more per-
sons associated together for any lawful purpose can make a corpora-
tion.52 No approval by any organ of the State is necessary, and there is
no exceptional rule touching politische socialpolitische oderreligiose
Vereine. Many societies of the most various kinds have taken advantage
of this offer; but many have not. I will not speak of humble societies
which are going to have no property or very little: only some chess-men
perhaps. Nor will I speak of those political societies which spring up in
England whenever there is agitation: a “Tariff Reform Association” or a
“Free Food League” or the like. It was hardly to be expected that bodies
which have a temporary aim, and which perhaps are not quite certain
what that aim is going to be, would care to appear as corporations. But
many other bodies which are not poor, which hope to exist for a long
time, and which have a definite purpose have not accepted the offer. It is
so, for example, with clubs of what I may call the London type: clubs
which have houses in which their members can pass the day. And it is so
with many learned societies. In a case which came under my own obser-
vation a society had been formed for printing and distributing among its
members books illustrating the history of English law. The question was
raised what to do with the copyright of these books, and it was proposed
that the society should make itself into a corporation; but the council of
the society—all of them lawyers, and some of them very distinguished
lawyers— preferred the old plan: preferred trustees. As an instance of
the big affairs which are carried on in the old way I may mention the
London Library, with a large house in the middle of London and more
than 200,000 books which its members can borrow.
Why all this should be so it would not be easy to say. It is not, I
believe, a matter of expense, for expense is involved in the maintenance
of the hedge of trustees, and the account of merely pecuniary profit and
loss would often, so I fancy, show a balance in favour of incorporation.
But apparently there is a widespread, though not very definite belief,
that by placing itself under an incorporating Gesetz, however liberal
and elastic that Gesetz may be, a Verein would forfeit some of its lib-
erty, some of its autonomy, and would not be so completely the mistress
of its own destiny as it is when it has asked nothing and obtained noth-
ing from the State. This belief may wear out in course of time; but I feel
sure that any attempt to drive our Vereine into corporateness, any
Registerzwang, would excite opposition. And on the other hand a pro-
posal to allow the courts of law openly to give the name of corporationsTrust and Corporation/43
to Vereine which have neither been chartered nor registered would not
only arouse the complaint that an intolerable uncertainty was being in-
troduced into the law (we know little of Austria) but also would awake
the suspicion that the proposers had some secret aim in view: perhaps
nothing worse than what we call “red-tape,” but perhaps taxation and
“spoliation.”
Hitherto (except when the Stock Exchange was mentioned) I have
been speaking of societies that do not divide gain among their members.
I must not attempt to tell the story of the English Aktiengesellschaft. It
has often been told in Germany and elsewhere. But there is just one
point to which I would ask attention.
In 1862 Parliament placed corporate form and juristic personality
within easy reach of “any seven or more persons associated together for
any lawful purpose.” I think we have cause to rejoice over the width of
these words, for we in England are too much accustomed to half-mea-
sures, and this was no half-measure. But still we may represent it as an
act of capitulation. The enemy was within the citadel.
In England before the end of the seventeenth century men were try-
ing to make joint-stock companies with transferable shares or “actions”
(for that was the word then employed), and this process had gone so far
that in 1694 a certain John Houghton could issue in his newspaper a
price list which included the “actions” of these unincorporated compa-
nies side by side with the stock of such chartered corporations as the
Bank of England. We know something of the structure of these compa-
nies, but little of the manner in which their affairs were regarded by
lawyers and courts of law. Then in 1720, as all know, the South Sea
Bubble swelled and burst. A panic-stricken Parliament issued a law,
which, even when we now read it, seems to scream at us from the statute
book. Unquestionably for a time this hindered the formation of joint-
stock companies. But to this day there are living among us some insur-
ance companies, in particular “the Sun,” which were living before 1720
and went on living in an unincorporate condition.53 And then, later on
when the great catastrophe was forgotten, lawyers began coldly to dis-
sect the words of this terrible Act and to discover that after all it was not
so terrible. For one thing, it threatened with punishment men who with-
out lawful authority “presumed to act as a corporation.” But how could
this crime be committed? From saying that organization is corporateness
English lawyers were precluded by a long history. They themselves were
members of the Inns of Court. Really it did not seem clear that men44/Frederic Maitland
could “presume to act as a corporation” unless they said in so many
words that they were incorporated, or unless they usurped that sacred
symbol, the common seal. English law had been compelled to find the
essence of real or spurious corporateness among comparatively superfi-
cial phenomena.
Even the more definite prohibitions in the Statute of 1720, such as
that against “raising or pretending to raise a transferable stock,” were
not, so the courts said, so stringent as they might seem to be at first
sight. In its panic Parliament had spoken much of mischief to the public,
and judges, whose conception of the mischievous was liable to change,
were able to declare that where there was no mischievous tendency there
was no offence. Before “the Bubble Act” was repealed in 1825 most of
its teeth had been drawn.
But the unbeschränkte Haftbarkeit of partners was still maintained.
That was a thoroughly practical matter which Englishmen could thor-
oughly understand. Indeed from the first half of the nineteenth century
we have Acts of Parliament which strongly suggest that this is the very
kernel of the  whole matter. All else Parliament was by this time very
willing to grant: for instance, active and passive Processfähigkeit, the
capacity of suing and being sued as unit in the name of some secretary
or treasurer. And this, I may remark in passing, tended still further to
enlarge our notion of what can be done by “unincorporated companies.”
It was the day of half-measures. In an interesting case an American
court once decided that a certain English company was a corporation,
though an Act of our Parliament had expressly said that it was not.
And if our legislature would not by any general measure grant full
corporateness, our courts were equally earnest in maintaining the un-
limited liability of the Gesellschaftsmitglieder.
But the wedge was introduced. If a man sells goods and says in so
many words that he will hold no one personally liable for the price, but
will look only to a certain subscribed fund, must we not hold him to his
bargain? Our courts were very unwilling to believe that men had done
anything so foolish; but they had to admit that personal liability could
be excluded by sufficiently explicit words. The wedge was in. If the
State had not given way, we should have had in England joint-stock
companies, unincorporated, but contracting with limited liability. We
know now-a-days that men are not deterred from making contracts by
the word “limited.” We have no reason to suppose that they would have
been deterred if that word were expanded into four or five lines printedTrust and Corporation/45
at the head of the company’s letter-paper. It is needless to say that the
directors of a company would have strong reasons for seeing that due
notice of limited liability was given to every one who had contractual
dealings with the company, for, if such notice were not given, they them-
selves would probably be the first sufferers.54
In England the State capitulated gracefully in 1862. And at the same
time it prohibited the formation of large unincorporated Gesellschaften.
No Verein or Gesellschaft consisting of more than twenty persons was
to be formed for the acquisition of gain unless it was registered and so
became incorporate. We may say, however, that this prohibitory rule
has become well-nigh a caput mortuum, and I doubt whether its exist-
ence is generally known, for no one desires to infringe it. If the making
of gain be the society’s object, the corporate form has proved itself to be
so much more convenient than the unincorporate that a great deal of
ingenuity has been spent in the formation of very small corporations in
which the will of a single man is predominant (“one-man companies”).
Indeed the simple Gesellschaft of English law, though we cannot call it
a dying institution, has been rapidly losing ground.55
In America it has been otherwise. As I understand, the unincorporate
Aktiengesellschaft with its property reposing in trustees lived on beside
the new trading corporations. I am told that any laws prohibiting men
from forming large unincorporated partnerships would have been re-
garded as an unjustifiable interference with freedom of contract, and
even that the validity of such a law might not always be beyond ques-
tion. A large measure of limited liability was secured by carefully worded
clauses. I take the following as an example from an American “trust
deed”:
The trustees shall have no power to bind the shareholders person-
ally. In every written contract they may make, reference shall be
made to this declaration of trust. The person or corporation con-
tracting with the trustees shall look to the funds and property of
the trust for the payment under such contract. . . and neither the
trustees nor the shareholders, present or future, shall be person-
ally liable therefor.
The larger the affairs in which the Verein or Gesellschaft is en-
gaged, the more securely will such clauses work, for (to say nothing of
legal requirements) big affairs will naturally take the shape of written
documents. Then those events occurred which have inseparably con-46/Frederic Maitland
nected the two words “trust” and “corporation.” I am not qualified to
state with any precision the reasons which induced American capitalists
to avoid the corporate form when they were engaged in constructing the
greatest aggregations of capital that the world had yet seen; but I believe
that the American corporation has lived in greater fear of the State than
the English corporation has felt for a long time past. A judgment dis-
solving a corporation at the suit of the Staatsanwalt as a penalty for
offences that it has committed has been well-known in America. We
have hardly heard of anything of the kind in England since the Revolu-
tion of 1688. The dissolution of the civic corporation of London for its
offences in the days of Charles II served as a reductio ad absurdum. At
any rate “trust” not “corporation” was the form that the financial and
industrial magnates of America chose when they were fashioning their
immense designs.
Since then there has been a change. Certain of the States (especially
New Jersey) began to relax their corporation laws in order to attract the
great combinations. A very modest percentage is worth collecting when
the capital of the company is reckoned in millions. So now-a-days the
American “trust” (in the sense in which economists and journalists use
that term) is almost always if not quite always a corporation.
And so this old word, the “trust is” of the Salica, has acquired a
new sense. Any sort of capitalistic combination is popularly called a
“trust” if only it is powerful enough, and Englishmen believe that Ger-
many is full of “trusts.”
VI
And now let me once more repeat that the connection between Trust and
Corporation is very ancient. It is at least four centuries old. Henry VIII
saw it. An Act of Parliament in which we may hear his majestic voice
has these words in its preamble:56
Where by reason of feoffments... made of trust of... lands to the
use of... guilds, fraternities, comminalties, companies or
brotherheads erected... by common assent of the people without
any corporation... there groweth to the King. . . and other lords
and subjects ofthe realm the same like losses and inconveniences....
as in case where lands be aliened into mortmain.
We see what the mischief is. The hedge of trustees will be kept in
such good repair that there will be no escaeta, no relevium, no custodia,Trust and Corporation/47
for behind will live a Genossenschaft keenly interested in the mainte-
nance of the hedge, and a Genossenschaft which has made itself without
asking the King’s permission. Now no one, I think, can read this Act
without seeing that it intends utterly to suppress this mischief.57 Hap-
pily, however, the Act also set certain limits to trusts for obituary masses,
and not long after Henry’s death Protestant lawyers were able to say
that the whole Act
was directed against “superstition.” Perhaps the members of the
Inns of Court were not quite impartial expositors of the King’s inten-
tions. But in a classical case it was argued that the Act could not mean
what it apparently said, since almost every town in England—and by
“town” was meant not Stadt but Dorf—had land held for it by trustees.
Such a statement, it need hardly be said, is not to be taken literally. But
the trust for a Communalverband or for certain purposes of a
Communalverband is very ancient and has been very common: it is a
“charity.” There was a manor (Rittergut) near Cambridge which was
devoted to paying the wages of the knights who represented the county
of Cambridge in Parliament.58
It is true that in this quarter the creation of trusts, though it was
occasionally useful, could not directly repair the harm that was being
done by that very sharp attack of the Concessionstheorie from which we
suffered. All our Communalverbande, except the privileged boroughs,
remained at a low stage of legal development. They even lost ground,
for they underwent, as it were, a capitis diminutio when a privileged
order of communicates, namely the boroughs, was raised above them.
The county of the thirteenth century (when in solemn records we find so
bold a phrase as “die Grafschaft kommt und sags”) was nearer to clear
and unquestionable personality than was the county of the eighteenth
century. But if the English county never descended to the level of a
governmental district, and if there was always a certain element of “self-
government” in the strange system that Gneist described under that name,
that was due in a large measure (so it seems to me) to the work of the
Trust. That work taught us to think of the corporate quality which the
King kept for sale as a technical advantage. A very useful advantage it
might be, enabling men to do in a straightforward fashion what other-
wise they could only do by clumsy methods; but still an advantage of a
highly technical kind.
Much had been done behind the hedge of trustees in the way of
constructing Körper (“bodies”) which to the eye of the plain man looked48/Frederic Maitland
extremely like Korporationen, and no one was prepared to set definite
limits to this process.
All this reacted upon our system of local government. Action and
reaction between our Vereine and our Communalverbande was the easier,
because we knew no formal severance of Public from Private Law. One
of the marks of our Korporation, so soon as we have any doctrine about
the matter, is its power of making “bye-laws” (or better “bylaws”); but,
whatever meaning Englishmen may attach to that word now-a-days, its
original meaning, so etymologists tell us, was not Nebengesetz but
Dorigesetz.59 And then there comes the age when the very name “corpo-
ration” has fallen into deep discredit, and stinks in the nostrils of all
reformers. Gierke’s account of the decadence of the German towns is in
the main true of the English boroughs, though in the English case there
is something to be added about parliamentary elections and the strife
between Whig and Tory. And there is this also to be added that the
Revolution of 1688 had sanctified the “privileges” of the boroughs. Had
not an attack upon their “privileges,” which were regarded as
wohlerworbene Rechte, “vested rights,” cost a King his crown? The
municipal corporations were both corrupt and sacrosanct. And so all
sorts of devices were adopted in order that local government might be
carried on without the creation of any new corporations. Bodies of “com-
missioners” or of “trustees” were instituted by Gesetz, now in this place,
and now in that, now for this purpose, and now for that; but good care
was taken not to incorporate them. Such by this time had been the devel-
opment of private trusts and charitable trusts, that English law had many
principles ready to meet these “trusts of a public nature.” But no great
step forward could be taken until the borough corporations had been
radically reformed and the connection between corporateness and privi-
lege had been decisively severed.
A natural result of all this long history is a certain carelessness in
the use of terms and phrases which may puzzle a foreign observer. I can
well understand that he might be struck by the fact that whereas our
borough is (or, to speak with great strictness, the mayor, aldermen, and
burgesses are) a corporation, our county, after all our reforms, is still
not a corporation, though the County Council is. But though our mo-
dem statutes establish some important distinctions between counties and
boroughs, I very much doubt whether any practical consequences could
be deduced from the difference that has just been mentioned, and I am
sure that it does not correspond to any vital principle.Trust and Corporation/49
I must bring to an end this long and disorderly paper, and yet I have
said very little of those Communalverbände which gave Dr Redlich
occasion to refer to what I had written. I thought, however, that the one
small service that I could do to those who for many purposes are better
able to see us than we are to see ourselves was to point out that an
unincorporated Communalverhand is no isolated phenomenon which
can be studied by itself, but is a member of a great genus, with which we
have been familiar ever since the days when we began to borrow a theory
of corporations from the canonists. The technical machinery which has
made the existence of “unincorporated bodies” of many kinds possible
and even comfortable deserves the attention of all who desire to study
English life or any part of it. What the foreign observer should specially
remember (if I may be bold enough to give advice) is that English law
does not naturally fall into a number of independent pieces, one of which
can be mastered while the others are ignored. It may be a clumsy whole;
but it is a whole, and every part is closely connected with every other
part. For example, it does not seem to me that a jurist is entitled to argue
that the English county, being umncorporate, and having no juristic per-
sonality, can only be a “passive” Verband, until he has considered whether
he would apply the same argument to, let us say, the Church of Rome
(as seen by English law), the Wesleyan “Connexion,” Lincoln’s Inn, the
London Stock Exchange, the London Library, the Jockey Club, and a
Trade Union. Also it is to be remembered that the making of grand
theories is not and never has been our strong point. The theory that lies
upon the surface is sometimes a borrowed theory which has never pen-
etrated far, while the really vital principles must be sought for in out-of-
the-way places.
It would be easy therefore to attach too much importance to the fact
that since 1889 we have had upon our statute-book the following words:
“In this Act and in every Act passed after the commencement of this Act
the expression ‘person’ shall, unless the contrary intention appears, in-
clude any body of persons corporate or unincorporate.”60 I can imagine
a country in which a proposal to enact such a clause would give rise to
vigorous controversy; but I feel safe in saying that there was nothing of
the sort in England. For some years past a similar statutory interpreta-
tion had been set upon the word “person” in various Acts of Parliament
relating to local government.61 Some of our organs of local government,
for example the “boards of health,” had not been definitely incorpo-
rated, and it was, I suppose, to meet their case that the word “person”50/Frederic Maitland
was thus explained. It is not inconceivable that the above cited section
of the Act of 1889 may do some work hereafter; but I have not heard of
its having done any work as yet; and I fear that it cannot be treated as
evidence that we are dissatisfied with such theories of personality as
have descended to us in our classical books.
One more word may be allowed me. I think that a foreign jurist
might find a very curious and instructive story to tell in what he would
perhaps call the publicistic extension of our Trust Begriff. No one, I
suppose, would deny that, at all events in the past, ideas whose native
home was the system of Private Law have done hard work outside that
sphere, though some would perhaps say that the time for this sort of
thing has gone by. Now we in England have lived for a long while in an
atmosphere of “trust,” and the effects that it has had upon us have be-
come so much part of ourselves that we ourselves are not likely to detect
them. The trustee, “der zwar Rechtsträger aber nur in fremdem Inter-
esse ist” is well known to all of us, and he becomes a centre from which
analogies radiate. He is not, it will be remembered, a mandatory. It is
not Vertrag that binds him to the Destinatär. He is not, it will be remem-
bered, a guardian. The Destinatär may well be a fully competent per-
son. Again, there may be no Destinatär at all, his place being filled by
some “charitable” Zweck. We have here a very elastic form of thought
into which all manner of materials can be brought. So when new organs
of local government are being developed, at first sporadically and after-
wards by general laws, it is natural not only that any property they
acquire, lands or money, should be thought of as “trust property,” but
that their governmental powers should be regarded as being held in trust.
Those powers are, we say, “intrusted to them,” or they are “intrusted
with” those powers. The fiduciary character of the Rechtsträger can in
such a case be made apparent in legal proceedings, more or less analo-
gous to those which are directed against other trustees. And, since prac-
tical questions will find an answer in the elaborate statutes which regu-
late the doings of these Körper, we have no great need to say whether
the trust is for the State, or for the Gemeinde, or for a Zweck. Some
theorists who would like to put our institutions into their categories,
may regret that this is so; but so it is.
Not content, however, with permeating this region, the Trust presses
forward until it is imposing itself upon all wielders of political power,
upon all the organs of the body politic. Open an English newspaper, and
you will be unlucky if you do not see the word “trustee” applied to “theTrust and Corporation/51
Crown” or to some high and mighty body. I have just made the experi-
ment, and my lesson for to-day is, that as the Transvaal has not yet
received a representative constitution, the Imperial parliament is “a trustee
for the colony.” There is metaphor here. Those who speak thus would
admit that the trust was not one which any court could enforce, and
might say that it was only a “moral” trust. But I fancy that to a student
of Staatswissenschaft legal metaphors should be of great interest, espe-
cially when they have become the commonplaces of political debate.
Nor is it always easy to say where metaphor begins. When a Statute
declared that the Herrschaft which the East India Company had ac-
quired in India was held “in trust” for the Crown of Great Britain, that
was no idle proposition but the settlement of a great dispute. It is only
the other day that American judges were saying that the United States
acquired the sovereignty of Cuba upon trust for the Cubans.
But I have said enough and too much.62
Notes
1. Ibid. Bd. xxx, S. 167.
2. [Translation: The legal institution known as the Trust, which origi-
nated out of certain requirements of the English land-law, has gradu-
ally developed into a general institution with a far-reaching and prac-
tical significance in all aspects of legal life; and, during this process,
it has acquired, in a juridical sense, a remarkably refined and even a
perfected form.]
3. Laband, Die Vermögensrechtlichen Klagen, S. 5–7 [Translation: The
action possesses the distinctive characteristic that it is based, not on
the cause of action asserted by the plaintiff, but on that which he
demands in his claim, or, in other words, his objective; and in respect
of this the judge can help him....In the medieval sources, on the con-
trary, there is absent any characterization, or classification, of ac-
tions in conformity with the legal relationships that lie at the basis of
actions; and, more particularly, there is no distinction drawn between
proprietary and personal actions, or, in other words, between actions
in rem and in personam. The expression clage up gut [in England
real action], which seems to correspond to the Roman term actio in
rem, has no connection with the juridical nature of the plaintiff’s
right: on the contrary, it has reference only to the subject-matter of52/Frederic Maitland
the plaintiff’s claim.]
4. Heymann, in the sketch of English law that is included in the new
edition of Holtzendorff’s Encyklopädie has declined to place our Trust
under “Des Sachenrecht” or under “Forderungsrecht.” It seems to
me that in this as in many other instances he has shown a true insight
into the structure of our system.
5. Gierke’s Untersuchungen, 1895.
6. Translation: The relationship of Treuhand is normally established by
contract between the testator and the person whom he has chosen as
Treuhänder. Where a direct control over corporeal things is conferred
on the Treuhänder, this contract frequently assumes the outward form
of a contract which has the effect of transferring title, or, in other
words, a conveyance. The things in question are transferred to him
per cartam for the purpose that has been willed by the testator. Ac-
cordingly, the transaction is expressly referred to as ‘tradere res’....
Certain documents of the Regesto di Farfa, dating from the eleventh
century, speak of the ‘investiture’ which the donor has conferred upon
the Treuhänder. The donor transfers to the Treuhänder not only the
land, but also, in accordance with Lombard custom in cases where
proprietary rights,, rights in rem, are conveyed, both the document of
title by which he had himself acquired the property and also those of
his predecessors in title,, so far as he has those in his possession. lf
the donor is a Frank, he uses the Frankish symbols of investiture,
namely, festuca notata, knife, sod, branch of a tree, and glove.]
7. [Translation: As has just been proved, the Treuhänder has, by virtue
of the face that he is the legal successor, his own proprietary right in
the corporeal things that have been transferred to him. What is the
nature of this right? In the first place, it may be observed that we
have certain documents which, judging from their tenor, leave us in
no doubt that the Treuhänder has full ownership and is not restricted,
either by the proprietary or by the contractual rights of other persons,
in the free enjoyment and the free alienation of the property. These
are all cases in which the donor, for the good of his soul, wills that the
things shall be at the free disposition of the Treuhänder, who, in the
true sense of the term, is to play the role of a dispenser.]
8. [Translation: the full, free power of disposition, but a right of alien-
ation that is strictly bound within certain definite limits. Here, in
contrast with the legal position of the aforementioned Treuhänder
who acts as a dispenser optimo jure, he occupies an inferior position.Trust and Corporation/53
But what is the nature of this inferiority? We may, in the present
place, leave unanswered the question whether in these cases the
Treuhänder is limited from the view-point of obligations, that is,
whether he is bound, by the private law of contract and delict, to the
donor or his heirs or any other persons. The sole question at the mo-
ment is whether his right is restricted from the view-point of the own-
ership of property; and this question must be answered in the affir-
mative.]
9. [Translation: ownership, but yet ownership subject to a condition
subsequent, a condition the fulfilment of which extinguishes the own-
ership. The condition became operative when the subject-matter of
the gift, the property, was alienated contrary to the expressed pur-
pose of the gift or when for any reason that purpose became impos-
sible of realization. The result, in such circumstances, was that the
ownership of the Treuhänder was extinguished; and, without any re-
transfer, the subject-matter of the gift became the property of the
donor or of his heirs, who could at once bring an action in rem, the
proprietary action, and thereby obtain once more the possession of
the thing.]
10. [Translation: The limitation of the ownership zu treuer Hand, that is
the ownership of a Treuhänder, by reason of the presence of a condi-
tion subsequent, could affect the title of third parties who acquired
the property subject to that limitation.... This result presupposed the
notoriety (publicity) of that limitation of the proprietary right, a pub-
licity of such character that every third party acquiring the property
could without hardship be subjected to the limitation whether or not,
in the individual case, he actually knew of the limitation. In respect of
land it is indeed possible that at an early time the Lombards knew a
folk-law form of transfer of rights whereby the act of transfer be-
came sufficiently known to the members of the folk-community at
the very moment when the act itself took place, that is, when the
transfer was effected on the land itself or in court, in mallo. In the
period with which we are concerned, however, the form of transfer
almost always employed was that of traditio cartae; and in any event
that was the form used in most cases of gift mortis causa, including
gift zu treuer Hand.... Every transfer of rights taking place by tradi-
tio cartae was, therefore, fully documented.... Whoever desired to
acquire a piece of land by a derivative title obtained accordingly,
reliable information in regard to the rights of his transferor by de-54/Frederic Maitland
manding the production of the carta which had been executed for
such transferor by his predecessor in rifle. At an early time it became
in fact the usage that the carta, as a permanent proof of the legality
of the title, was transferred along with the land itself. It was only a
natural consequence of this usage that, in addition to the title-deed of
the transferor himself, all the title-deeds of his predecessors, so far as
in fact he had these in his possession, were also handed over to his
successor in title. Whoever, therefore, desired to acquire a piece of
land from a Treuhänder knew at once, by an examination of the title-
deeds, the limited nature of the Treuhänder’s title as being one that
was subject to a condition subsequent. In case, however, contrary to
the customary procedure, the purchaser did not trouble about the
documents of title there was no hardship in the fact, so far as he was
concerned, that the condition, although actually unknown to him,
nevertheless affected his own title to the land. The harm which re-
sulted to him was not undeserved.]
11. [Translation: This, however, had validity only in the case of lands.
In the case of transactions respecting chattels, as in other Germanic
laws, there were no legal provisions that publicity would operate in
such a way as to give effect, so far as third parties were concerned, to
conditions restricting alienation.... It is true that the testamentary
Treuhänder was legally bound by the purpose expressed in the will in
respect of chattels not less than in the case of lands. Certain it is,
indeed, that he was himself bound so far as his own proprietary right
was concerned, and, as in the case of land, he held the chattels by a
right of ownership that was subject to a condition subsequent....Had
he, however, transferred the chattels to the wrong persons, the heirs
of the donor had no redress against such third parties, even when the
latter had had notice of the conditional title of the Treuhänder. The
reason which in the case of land subjected all third parties to the
working of the condition was not present in the case of chattels. If the
chattels entrusted to the Treuhänder reached the hands of third par-
ties owing to a breach of the trust and were therefore not recoverable
by the proprietary action ‘Malo ordine possides,’ then the beneficia-
ries could only bring a personal action for damages.]
12. I am aware that Schultze’s construction of the right of the Lombard
Treuhänder as “resolutiv bedingtes Eigenthum” is open to dispute.
See, for example, Caillemer, Exécution Testamentaire (Lyon, 1901),
351. A great deal of what M. Caillemer says about England in thisTrust and Corporation/55
excellent book seems to be both new and true.
13. I do not wish to deny that there were other causes for trusts; but
comparatively they were of little importance.
14. Our “joint ownership” is not a very strong form of
Gesammthandschaft. One of several “joint owners” has a share that
he can alienate inter vivos; but he has nothing to give by testament.
15. Testamenta Eboracensia (Surtees society), vol. I, p. 223. In the
same volume (p. 113) an earlier example will be found, the will of
William, Lord Latimer (13th April, 1381) see also the will of the Earl
of Pembroke (5th May, 1372), and the will of the Earl of Arundel (4
March, 1392–1393) in J. Nichols, Royal Wills (1780), pp. 92, 120.
16. This is an Anwartschaft.
17. Select Cases in Chancery (Selden society), p. 69.
18. This is not quite true. A few attempts were made to attain the end by
means of “conditions,” and Edward III himself made, so it seems,
some attempt of this kind. But the mechanism of a “condition” would
have been very awkward.
19. It may have been of decisive importance that at some critical mo-
ment the King himself wanted to leave some land by will. Edward III
had tried ineffectually to do this. In 1417 King Henry V had a great
mass of land in the hands of feoffees (including four bishops, a duke
and three earls) and made a will in favour of his brothers. See Nichols.
Royal Wills, 236.
20. At starting the phrase would be cestui a qui oes le feffement fut fait.
This degenerates into cestui que use; and then cestui que trust is
made.
21. Year Book, Trin. II Edw. IV, f. 8: “Si mon feoffee de trust etc.
enfeoffa un autre, que conust bien que le feoffor rien ad forsque a
mon use, subpoena girra vers ambideux scil. auxibien vers le feoffee
come vers le feoffor... pur ceo que en conscience il purchase ma terre.
22. Translation: In respect of land it is indeed possible that at an early
time the Lombards knew a folk-law form of transfer of rights whereby
the act of transfer became sufficiently known to the members of the
folkcommunity at the very moment when the act itself took place. In
the period with which we are concerned, however, the form of trans-
fer almost always employed was that of traditio cartae; and in any
event that was the form used in most cases of gift mortis causa,
including gift zu treuer Hand.
23. The law about this matter had become somewhat doubtful before56/Frederic Maitland
Parliament intervened.
24. Some writers even in theoretical discussion have allowed themselves
to speak of the destinatory as “the real owner,” and of the trustee’s
ownership as “nominal” and “fictitious.” See Salmond, Jurisprudence,
p. 278. But I think it is better and safer to say with a great American
teacher that “Equity could not create rights in rem if it would, and
would not if it could.” See Langdell, Harvard Law Review, vol. I, p.
60.
25. In the oldest cases the Court of Chancery seems to enforce the “chari-
table” trust upon the complaint of anyone who is interested, without
requiring the presence of any representatives of the State.
26. An Englishman might say that §2109 of the B.G.B. contains the
German “rule against perpetuities” and that it is considerably more
severe than is the English.
27. In some cases the land will have to be sold, but the “charity” will get
the price.
28. Pandekten, S. 442 [Translation: There are good grounds in support
of the view that the creditors of the Fiduziar cannot touch the
Zweckvermögen unless their claims arise out of the Zweckvermögen
itself; moreover, that in the event of the bankruptcy of the Fiduziar or
of a sequestration, the Zweckvermögen can be dealt with on a special
footing, because the person who rakes the property holds it in his
own name, it is true, but only in the interests of
third parties.]
29. Pandekten, S. 341 [Translation: In the case of a foundation unable
to act without direction, the person to whom the Zweckvermögen is
transferred is usually a legal person, a corporation; for only such a
person furnishes a permanent basis for the foundation.]
30. Trustees Appointment Acts, 1850–69–90.
31. Marquardsen’s Handbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts, Bd. I, S. 367.
32. [Translation: As the earlier State-Church, or Staatskirchenthum,
began to tolerate certain other religious societies, owing to changed
conditions it could not permit them to hold the legal position of pri-
vate clubs, for the reason that it looked upon religion as a matter for
the State. Accordingly, it adopted the attitude that these associations
should be treated in certain respects as corporations of public law,
with corresponding rights but, on the other hand, it subjected such
associations to a far-reaching control and interference on the part of
the State.]Trust and Corporation/57
33. Hinschius, op. cit. S. 222–224.
34. In Latin documents the word corresponding to our inn is hospitium.
35. F. Martin, History of Lloyd’s, 1876.
36. C. Duguid, Story of the Stock Exchange, 1901.
37. London Stock Exchange Commission, Parliamentary Papers (1878),
vol. XIX.
38. In a conceivable case the prospective right to an aliquot part of the
property of a club that was going to be dissolved might be valuable to
a member’s creditors; but this would be a rare case, and I can find
nothing written about it. Some clubs endeavour by their rules to ex-
tinguish the right of a bankrupt member.
39. Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, s. 11.
40. I believe that all the decisions given by our Courts in any way af-
fecting our clubs will be found in a small book: J. Wertheimer, Law
relating to Clubs, ed. 3, by A. W. Chaster (1903 ).
41. It was otherwise with the unincorporated Actiengesellschaft, but
that is almost a thing of the past. A few formed long ago may still be
living in an unincorporated condition, e.g., the London Stock Ex-
change.
42. Partnership Act, 1890, 5. 1. For the meaning of these words, see F.
Pollock, Digest of the Law of Partnership, ed. 6.
43. B.G.B. § 54.
44. See Wertheimer, op. cit. p 73.
45. Gierke, Vereine ohne Rechtsfähigkeit, zweite Auflage, S.20 [Trans-
lation: Possibly there is a customary law to the effect that clubs which
do not as such possess legal capacity are to be placed in the category
of corporations so far as liability for harm caused by illegal acts is
concerned ]
46. Vereine ohne Rechtsfähigkeit, S. 14.
47. [Translation: The property of a club belongs to the members for the
time being, but, as partnership-property [club-property], it is sepa-
rated from the rest of the property of the members as being property
which serves the partnership’s purpose [club’s purpose]; it is a spe-
cial or separate property which belongs to the partners [club-mem-
bers] in undivided shares; and from this point of view it closely re-
sembles the property of a corporation.]
48. Gierke, Op. Cit. S. 21. [Translation: The club can acquire property
not only by transactions inter vivos but also by testate or intestate
succession; for there is no legal objection to the appointment of the58/Frederic Maitland
members for the time being, in their partnership [or club] capacity, as
heirs, or to giving them a legacy.]
49. [Translation: The restrictions [laid down in the statutory law of the
several German states] in respect to the acquisition of rights on the
part of corporations cannot be extended to clubs which do not as
such possess legal capacity.]
50. Companies Act, 1862, 5. 21.
51. Our law about this matter is now represented by Rules of the Su-
preme Court of Judicature, Order xvi, Rule 9.
52. Companies Act, 1862, S. 66.
53. F. B. Relton, Fire Insurance Companies (1893).
54. In England development along this line stopped at this point because
wirtschaftliche Vereine became corporations under the Gesetz of 1862.
English law had gone as far as the first, but not, I believe as far as the
second of the two following sentences: “Es steht namentlich nichts
im Wege, eme rechtsgeschäftliche Verpflichtung der Mitglieder so zu
begründen, dass jedes Mitglied nur mit einem Theil seines Vermögens
dass es insbesondere nur mit seinem Antheil am Vereinsvermögen
haftet. Ist aber eine solche Abrede wirksam, so kann auch von
vornherein durch die Satzung die Vertretungsmacht des Vorstandes
dahin eingeschränkt werden, dass er die Mitglieder nur unter
Beschränkung ihrer Haftung auf ihre Antheile verpflichten kann”
(Gierke, op. cit. S. 39). Then as regards our clubs, there is, as al-
ready said, no presumption that the committee or the trustees can
incur debts for which the members will be liable even to a limited
degree.
55. A distinction which, roughly speaking, is similar to that drawn by
B.G.B. §§ 21, 22 was drawn by our Act of 1862, S. 4: “No company,
association or partnership consisting of more than twenty persons
[ten persons, if the business is banking] shall be formed for the pur-
pose of carrying on any business that has for its object the acquisi-
tion of gain by the company, association or partnership, or by the
individual members thereof unless it is registered.” I believe that in
the space of forty years very few cases have arisen in which it was
doubtful whether or not a Verein fell within these words.
56. Stat. 23 Hen. VIII, c. 10.
57. The trust is to be void unless it be one that must come to an end
within twenty years.
58. Porter’s Case (1592), I Coke’s Reports, 16b, 24b, “For almost allTrust and Corporation/59
the lands belonging to the towns or boroughs not incorporate are
conveyed to several inhabitants of the parish and their heirs, upon
trust and confidence to employ the profits to such good uses, as de-
fraying the tax of the town, repairing the highways... and no such
uses (although they are common almost in every town) were ever
made void by the statute of 23 H. 8.” Some of the earliest instances
of “representative suits” that are known to me are cases of Elizabeth’s
day in which a few members of a village or parish “on behalf of
themselves and the others” complain against trustees.
59. Murray, New English Dictionary. It will be known to my readers
that in English books “Statute” almost always means Gesetz (Statutum
Regni) and rarely Statut. Only in the case of universities, colleges
cathedral chapters and the like can we render Statut by “Statute.” In
other cases we must say “by-laws,” “memorandum and articles of
association” and so forth, varying the phrase according to the nature
of the body of which we are speaking.
60. Interpretation Act, 1889, 5. 19.
61. Public Health Act, 1872, 5. 60.
62. It did not seem expedient to burden this slight sketch with many
references to books; but the following are among the best treatises
which deal with those matters of which I have spoken: Lewin, Law of
Trusts, ed. 10 (1898); Tudor, Law of Charities and Mortmain, ed. 3
(1889); Lindley, Law of Partnership, ed. 6 (1893); Lindley, Law of
Companies, ed. 6 (1902); Pollock, Digest of the Law of Partnership,
ed. 6 (1895); Buckley, Law and Practice under the Companies Act,
ed. 8 (1902); Palmer, Company Law, ed. 2 (1898); Wertheimer, Law
relating to Clubs, ed. 3 (1903); Underhill, Encyclopaedia of Forms,
vol. III (1903), pp. 728–814 (Clubs). As regards the early history of
“uses” or trusts, an epoch was made by O. W. Holmes, “Early En-
glish Equity,” Law Quarterly Review, vol. I, p. 162.